Is the Baltic Capesize Index a good proxy for actual Capesize earnings? : a simulation approach by Brevig, Håkon & Hoberg, Anders
 
Is  the  Baltic  Capesize  Index  a  good  
proxy  for  actual  Capesize  earnings?   
  –  A  simulation  approach 
 
By: Håkon Brevig  
&  
Anders Hoberg 
Supervisor: Professor Roar Os Ådland 
 
Master thesis in Financial Economics 
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are responsible 
−   through   the   approval   of   this thesis   −   for   the   theories   and   methods   used,   or   results   and  
conclusions drawn in this work.  
Norwegian School of Economics  
Bergen, Spring 2013 
 
 1 
Abstract 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate if the Baltic Capesize Index is a good proxy for 
actual Capesize earnings and why they deviate. The results may implicate if forward freight 
agreements are suitable for revenue management in practice. This because forward freight 
agreements are bought and held through maturity, and by definition, forward prices will converge 
to spot prices as they reach maturity. What matters is therefore the difference between spot index 
and actual earnings. 
 
The dissertation is based on a simulation approach where both single linear regression and the 
dollar-offset method are used to evaluate how good proxy the Baltic Capesize Index is. Our 
findings indicate that actual earnings are most affected by the basis risks geography and timing, 
and  the  “lag”  before  changed  market  conditions  are  reflected  in  actual  earnings.  Linear  regression  
and the dollar-offset method are ambiguous whether the Baltic Capesize Index is a good proxy 
for actual Capesize earnings. To conclude whether the Baltic Capesize Index is a good proxy it is 
therefore necessary to conduct more research on which methods that are appropriate within 
shipping. 
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1.  Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Shipping goods at sea has for decades been an important source for the trade flow in the world. 
Today the shipping market handles about 90% of world trade, making it vital to the functioning 
of the global economy (UNCTAD, 2012). The industry is commonly known to be cyclical and 
highly volatile, and its risky profile has turned many shipowners bankrupt, but also into 
millionaires.  
 
In the period from 2003 and up to the mid-2008, dry bulk freight rates reached levels that could 
not have been predicted in advance. Freight rates were up nearly 500% followed by a sharp 
collapse in the last quarter of 2008. In total, freight rates dropped nearly 95% (Alizadeh & 
Nomikos, 2009). There were several factors contributing to the high market volatility, which 
seems to have changed the way the industry view and manage its risks. This change has resulted 
in an environment where the participants are more aware of the risk they face and try their best to 
explore different strategies to manage and reduce risk. Freight derivatives are mainly found 
within bulk shipping, and can provide real gains for market participants. This, as their existence 
has made risk management cheaper, more flexible and readily available to parties exposed to 
movements in freight rates (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2008). 
 
From  a  shipowner’s  perspective,   the  usage  of derivatives have increased, both traded over-the-
counter and on exchange. Example of such an exchange is the International Maritime Exchange 
(IMAREX). Earlier studies, such as Kavussanos & Visvikis (2000a, 2000b, 2000c), have 
examined optimal hedge ratios and hedge effectiveness for short-term voyage based forward 
freight agreements within bulk shipping. These studies are based on standard financial theory and 
indicated a poor hedging performance. The poor performances were mainly due to lack of a cost-
of-carry relationship between forward freight agreements and spot prices. Freight is by definition 
a non-storable commodity, and forward prices are therefore driven by market expectations rather 
than a cost-of-carry relationship. In the Capesize segment, the most liquid contracts are currently 
found on time charter average based contracts, with a longer hedging horizon (The Baltic 
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Exchange, 2012). This implies that short-term hedging on voyage based contracts is not common 
in practice, making studies such as Kavussanos and Visvikis less relevant. 
 
In practice, forward freight agreements are bought and held through maturity, and forward prices 
will per definition converge to spot prices as they reach maturity. The difference between spot 
index and actual earnings may therefore implicate if forward freight agreements are suitable for 
revenue management in practice. As far as we know, no one has examined if the spot index is a 
good proxy for actual earnings in the Capesize segment.  This dissertation will therefore 
investigate if the Baltic Capesize index is a good proxy, which may imply if forward freight 
agreements are a suitable instrument for revenue management in practice. 
 
1.2 Objective 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate if the Baltic Capesize Index is a good proxy for 
actual Capesize earnings and why they deviate. The results may implicate if forward freight 
agreements are suitable for revenue management in practice. We will answer this question with a 
simulation approach, where actual earnings will be reproduced in the period 2003 - 2012. By 
using financial theory on hedging performance, we can highlight how good of a proxy the Baltic 
Capesize Index is for actual Capesize earnings. Implementing different physical basis risk factors, 
one by one, we hope to emphasize their importance and what separate the Baltic Capesize index 
from being a perfect proxy for Capesize earnings.  
 
1.3 Literature review 
As far as we know, no other studies have examined if the spot index is a good proxy for actual 
earnings in shipping, for any segments within the industry. However, there have been several 
studies examining the performance of derivatives in different commodities. Results from these 
studies are not directly transferable to our dissertation, but may still give an impression of the 
extent of hedging effectiveness to be expected. We will in the following briefly summaries some 
of these studies, with main focus on studies related to freight. 
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Hedging performance on financial derivatives is a well-documented area. For instance, Franckle 
(1980) examined the variance reduction that can be obtained for interest rate futures. Figlewski 
(1984) and Lindahl (1992) performed a similar study on stock indices, while Mallaris and Urrutia 
(1991) studied hedging performance on currencies. These studies suggest that it is possible to 
reduce the variability of spot positions by as much as 98%. Though, relatively limited studies 
have been conducted on derivatives based on freight. Part of this reason is due to the lack of 
available information, which is needed to support empirical work in these markets (Kavussanos 
& Visvikis, 2008). 
 
The little research that have been conducted on freight derivatives, are in contrast to what is seen 
in the financial market. Kavussanos and Nomikos (2000a) examined hedging performance of 
BIFFEX’s1 futures contracts on freight in the Panamax and Capesize segment. They applied 
naïve, conventional and time-varying hedge ratios and reported maximum hedge effectiveness of 
no more than 18.96% for in-sample studies, and 22.7% for out-of-sample studies. In-sample and 
out-of-sample studies indicate that hedge ratios estimated from VECM-GARCH-X models 
outperform alternative specifications in reducing market risk. When BIFFEX altered the 
composition of the underlying index in order to attempt to improve hedging effectiveness, 
Kavussanos and Nomikos (2000b) reported maximum hedge effectiveness ranging from 18.46% 
to 39.95% for the altered contracts. 
 
Skjetne (2005) took a similar approach as Kavussanos and Nomikos (2008), investigated hedging 
effectiveness of IMAREX futures contracts for some tanker routes and two Capesize routes, C4 
and C7. His results suggested hedging effectiveness in the range of 37% to 70%. 
 
Rasmussen and Tversland (2007) examined hedging effectiveness on Panamax futures contracts 
available at IMAREX. They estimated constant hedge ratio and time-varying hedge ratio for in-
sample studies, and reported effectiveness ranging from 29.5% to 34.26%. Their findings 
supported Kavussanos and Nomikos (2008) that the time-varying hedge ratio outperformed the 
constant hedge ratio for in-sample studies. 
 
                                                 
1 Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange 
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Gilleshammer and Hansen (2010) investigated hedge effectiveness on certain Panamax, Capesize 
and dirty tanker routes. They found that the hedging efficiency in the dry bulk market ranges 
from 38.5 - 76.1%, and concluded that time-varying-hedge ratio slightly outperforms constant-
hedge ratios.  
 
1.4 Structure of our dissertation 
In our dissertation we will start with a brief introduction to the shipping industry. We elaborate on 
historical development in trade flows, the dry bulk segment, important drivers of supply and 
demand, the freight rate mechanism and risk factors in shipping. Lastly we will introduce the 
Baltic Exchange, which compile freight rates and relevant indices. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical foundation of risk management, as well as theory on risk 
management  in  shipping.  We  will  also  present  Ederington’s  (1979) framework on how to find the 
optimal hedge ratio along with the hedging effectiveness, and discuss a possible alternative 
method. In addition, the theory behind basis risk and the relevant basis risk factors in shipping 
will be discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 gives a description of the model, and which assumptions that have been necessary to 
estimate actual earnings as realistic as possible. The model is described in such a detail that 
replication of our result is possible. In Chapter 5 we present and discuss our findings. Next, we 
will discuss limitations regarding our dissertation and suggest further research. Finally, we 
summarize the dissertation and conclude.  
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2. The shipping industry and the dry bulk segment 
This section we will give an introduction to the shipping industry and its complexity. We will 
also introduce the Baltic exchange, the only independent source of maritime market information 
for trading and settling physical and derivative contracts. 
 
2.1 Historical development 
Shipping goods by sea has for many generations been the most efficient way for transporting 
either raw materials or manufactured goods in large quantities. As trade between countries has 
increased over the last centuries, so has the seaborne trade. Looking at historical data, the total 
world seaborne trade in 1950 included about 500 million metric tonnes of cargo, and has since 
then expanded to 8,748 million metric tonnes in 2011. Today the international shipping industry 
is responsible for the carriage of about 90% of world trade and is therefore vital to the 
functioning of the global economy (UNCTAD, 2012). It is the availability, low cost and 
efficiency of maritime transport that has made possible the major shift towards industrial 
production in Asia.  
 
Table 2.1: Historical development in trade 
The table shows historical development in trade, given in metric tonnes  
Source: (UNCTAD, 2012) 
 
Today, there are four long hauls, standardized by the Baltic Exchange and the corresponding 
Capesize trip charter routes. Fronthaul trips ships ballast from Europe, pick up cargo in the 
Atlantic/Mediterranean and sail laden to Asia for discharge. Backhaul trips ships ballast from 
Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Oil and gas 1,440 1,871 1,755 2,163 2,747 2,742 2,642 2,772 2,796 
Main bulks 448 608 988 1,295 1,953 2,065 2,085 2,335 2,477 
Other dry cargo  717 1,225 1,265 2,526 3,334 3,422 3,131 3,302 3,475 
Total 2,605 3,704 4,008 5,984 8,034 8,229 7,858 8,409 8,748 
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Asian discharge ports, pick up cargo in Australia, Indonesia, Indian Ocean or South Africa and 
sail laden to Northwest Europe. Trans-Pacific trips ships ballast from North Asia, pick up cargo 
in Australia, Indonesia or west coast Americas, and return laden to North Asia. Trans-Atlantic 
trips ships ballast from Europe, pick up cargo in the Atlantic basin and return laden to a European 
discharge port. 
 
Examining seaborne trade patterns for the last ten years it is evident that there has been a 
tremendous drop in trade volume on both Backhaul and Trans-Atlantic routes. This development 
is shown in Exhibit 2.1, indicating how the trade volume in the Capesize segment has shifted 
towards the Pacific basin the last decade.  
 
Exhibit 2.1: Trade development in the Capesize segment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The different panels show trade flows in the Capesize segment in the years 2003 and 2012  
Source: Thurlestone shipping 
 
2.1 The dry bulk segment 
The bulk shipping   segment   has   traditionally   been   defined   by   the   principle   of   “one   ship,   one  
cargo”.  Often,  bulk  transport  has  been  associated  in  literature  and  in  practice  with  the  shipping  of  
commodities in unpackaged form, which can easily be handled and transported in bulk. The 
segment is subdivided according to the physical properties of cargoes, i.e. dry, and wet. The main 
20.1% 
14.8% 
46.6% 
18.5% 
2003 
11.0% 
23.6% 
60.8% 
4.7% 
2012 
Trans Atlantic
Fronthaul
Trans Pacific
Backhaul
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dry bulks are iron ore, coal, bauxite/alumina and phosphate, while main wet bulks are oil and 
liquid natural gas. 
 
Within dry bulk shipping, the market is typically classified into two main segments, major- and 
minor bulk. Major bulk includes iron ore, coal and grain, typically transported by large Capesize 
or Panamax vessels. Clarksons fleet register define a Capesize vessel as a dry bulk carrier with a 
loading capacity above 100,000 dead weight tonnage, from now on referred to as dwt, while a 
Panamax vessel has a loading capacity between 60,000-100,000 dwt. These two vessel types 
contribute with about two thirds of the world dry bulk trade. Minor bulk includes fertilizers, steel 
products, construction materials such as cement and aluminum, non-grain agricultural products, 
forest products and sundry minerals. These products are typically shipped by smaller vessels, 
such as Handymax, 40,000-60,000 dwt, and Handysize, 10,000-40,000 dwt (UNCTAD, 2012). 
 
Iron ore, coking coal and steam coal are the three largest commodities within dry bulk trade. Iron 
ore and coking coal are raw materials used in steel production, while steam coal is an important 
source of energy. In 2011 the main iron ore exporters were Australia, Brazil, India, South Africa 
and Canada, having a joint market share of 73%. The largest importers are China, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea. Figures show that most of the iron ore trade is between Australia and China, 
as Australia stands for 42% of the total export and China 63% of the total import (UNCTAD, 
2012). The largest importers of steam- and coking coal where China, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and India and the largest exporters where Indonesia, Australia and Russia (World Coal 
Association, 2012). According to these figures, most of the transportation is done in the Trans-
Pacific basin. This is in line with the trade flow presented in Exhibit 2.1. 
 
2.2 Supply and demand in shipping 
Shipping is a very complex industry, and to gain a better understanding of the market drivers we 
will introduce Stopford’s simplified model for supply and demand. This model emphasizes the 
ten most important factors that affect demand and supply for the seaborne trade. The main source 
is Stopford (2009) and all other sources will be referred to. 
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Table 2.2: Ten variables in the shipping market model  
Supply Demand 
1 World fleet 1 The world economy 
2 Fleet productivity 2 Seaborne commodity trades 
3 Shipbuilding production 3 Average haul 
4 Scrapping and losses 4 Random shocks 
5 Freight revenue 5 Transport costs 
Source: (Stopford, 2009) 
 
2.2.1 Supply 
2.2.1.1 World fleet 
The demand for vessels is dependent on four different decision-makers; shipowners, charterers, 
the financial sector and regulators. Shipowners are the primary decision-makers as they are 
ordering new vessels, scrapping old ones and laying up tonnage when the rates are low. 
Secondly, charterers can become shipowners themselves or influence shipowners through time 
charters. Thirdly, the financial players, such as banks, influence shipowners ability to buy new 
vessels as they lend out money to the investment. Lastly, regulators affect the supply by safety or 
environmental legislation that affects the transport capacity of the fleet.  
 
2.2.1.2 Fleet productivity 
The total fleet is fixed in size, but the fleet productivity is not constrained in the same manner. 
The fleet productivity is measured in tonne miles per deadweight and is determined by four main 
factors: speed, port time, deadweight utilization and loaded days at sea. First, speed determines 
the time a vessel spends on a voyage. Ådland (2013) show that Capesize vessels in the latter 
years have operated well below their designed speed and thereby reduces the transport capacity 
of the fleet. Secondly, time spent in ports is an important variable when evaluating productivity. 
New loading/off-loading technology has dramatically reduced the time spent in ports. Thirdly, 
deadweight utilization refers to the cargo capacity lost to bunker, stores etc. preventing a ship 
from carrying a full load. A common assumption is that bulk carriers operate at 95% and tankers 
 
 
 16 
operate at 96% of loading capacity. Vessels may also at some points transport cargo, which is far 
below its capacity. The final variable for measuring fleet productivity is divided between loaded 
days at sea and unproductive days. Unproductive days refer to time spent on ballast voyage, port 
congestion or off hire. A reduction in unproductive days allows for an increase in loaded days at 
sea. 
 
2.2.1.3 Shipbuilding production 
A third component for understanding the supply function is shipbuilding. New building of vessels 
plays an important role in the adjustments of capacity within the market. Shipbuilding is a long-
cycle business and the time between ordering and delivering can vary from 1 to 4 years. This 
depends on the kind of vessel and the order book held by the shipbuilder. On average a vessel has 
an estimated lifetime of 15 to 30 years. These time horizons mean that shipowners must place 
orders on the basis of future demand. Historically, intense ordering of new vessels has resulted in 
oversupply and eventually huge drop in freight rates. This was last seen in 2008 and, as the rates 
went downward, many shipping companies had trouble financing their new investments and went 
bankrupt (Church, Milford, & Kary, 2012) 
 
2.2.1.4 Scrapping and losses 
The growth of the merchant fleet depends not only on new buildings, but also on the scrapping 
rate and vessels lost at sea. There are several factors deciding when it is optimal to scrap a vessel. 
The main factors are the age of the vessel, technical obsolescence, scrapping prices, current 
earnings and market expectations. The buyer is usually an intermediary who resells it to 
demolition yards located in the Far East. Brokers with broad knowledge of the industry handle 
the transaction. Scrap prices can be very volatile and depend on the availability of vessels for 
scrap and the demand for scrap metal, as well as the vessels suitability for scrapping. 
 
2.2.1.5 Freight revenue 
The final factor influencing the supply of transportation by sea is freight rates. The freight rate is 
ultimately the regulator for decision-makers for adjusting their capacity in the short run, and to 
find ways of reducing their costs and improving their services in the long term. In shipping there 
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are two main pricing markets, these are the freight market and the liner market. In the freight 
market, such as bulk shipping, it is a wholesale operation where shipowners only sell their service 
to a small number of industrial customers. In contrast, liner shipping provides shipping services 
for small quantities of cargo to a wide range of customers. However, due to standardization of 
containers, the two segments have been brought closer together in economic terms. In both cases, 
the pricing system is central to the supply of transportation. In the short run, shipowners adjust 
their operating speed and move in and out of lay-up as rates adjust. In the long run, freight rates 
play an important role for investment decisions, which may result in scrapping or ordering of new 
vessels. 
 
2.2.2 Demand 
2.2.2.1 The world economy 
The most influential factor for shipping demand is the world economy. This is natural as the 
world generates demand for sea transportation through trade of raw materials or manufactured 
products. In general, the world economy affects demand by the following two factors; business 
cycle and the trade development cycle.  
 
The business cycle is considered to be the most important cause of short-term fluctuations in 
seaborne trade and shipping demand, as fluctuations in the world economy are transferred to the 
seaborne trade. Historically, there has been a correlation between growth in seaborne trade and 
world GDP.  
 
Trade  development  cycle  refers  to  countries’  long-term development. Over time, a country will 
shift its demand from raw materials to services and durables as it matures, which has a direct 
effect on the structure of seaborne trade. 
 
2.2.2.2 Seaborne commodity trade 
Seaborne commodity trade can be divided into either short or long term. The volatility observed 
in short-term is due to the seasonality of some trades. It is mainly explained by the seasonal 
variations caused by harvest for agricultural products and energy consumption. Transport volume 
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of agricultural commodities is in general hard to plan, so charterers of these commodities rely 
heavily on the spot charter market to meet their tonnage requirements. As a result, fluctuations in 
the grain market have a larger impact on the charter market than some much larger trades such as 
iron ore, where tonnage requirement are largely met by long-term contracts (Stopford, 2009).  
 
As for long-term trends, the best way for identifying these is to study the economic 
characteristics of the industries, which produce and consume traded goods. Even though 
businesses are different, there are four types of changes to look for. These are changes in demand 
for the particular commodity, changes in supply sources, changes due to a relocation of a 
processing plant that changes the trade pattern, and changes in the charterer’s  transport policy.  
 
2.2.2.3 Average haul 
The demand for seaborne transportation is determined by a precise matrix of distance which 
determines the time it takes for a vessel to complete a voyage. A vessel transporting iron ore from 
the Middle East to Western Europe via the Cape travels five times as far as a vessel sailing from 
Ceyhan in Turkey to Marseilles. This distance effect is referred to as average haul of the trade. 
Stopford (2009) defines average haul as the weight of cargo shipped (in tonne) times the average 
distance of transport, but it is usually referred to as distance only. 
 
Historically there have been several examples where vessel demand has changed due to changes 
in average haul. An example of such an incident was the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and 
1967. The closure increased the average distance from the Arabian Gulf to Europe from about 
6,000 miles to 11,000 miles. The impact on haul time can change quickly as stated in the example 
or it can change slowly over time as the demand for specific routes evolves.  
 
2.2.2.4 Random shocks 
As discussed above, sudden political decisions may have large effects of average haul. In 
addition, there are several other factors that can result in random shocks that upset the stability of 
the economic system. Examples of such events are wars, extreme weather and new resources. All 
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of them are different from cyclical events because they are unique and very often have a major 
impact on the shipping market.  
 
Historically, economic shocks have had the greatest impact on the shipping market. The great 
depression in the 1930s is a good example, where the Wall Street Crash in 1929 caused trade to 
decline. Trade also declined in 2009 as a result of the financial crisis in 2008. Capesize freight 
rates went from a historical high level in 2008 to a 95% decline.  
 
2.2.2.5 Cost of transportation 
The final factor influencing the demand for transportation by sea is the cost of transportation. The 
cost of transportation has always been an important factor when deciding to ship raw materials or 
processed goods. According to a study done by the EEC2, the transportation cost in 1980 
accounted for 20 percent of the cost of dry bulk cargo delivered to countries within the 
community (Stopford, 2009). Since then, larger and more fuel efficient vessels have generated a 
more cost efficient way for transporting goods at sea. Even though the cost of transportation is 
not as influential to the demand for seaborne trade as the world economy, their long-term effect 
on trade development should not be underrated.  
 
2.3 Freight rate mechanism 
The freight rate mechanism is considered to link supply and demand together. Shipowners and 
charterers come together and negotiate a freight rate, reflecting the balance of vessels and cargo 
available in the market.  Hence, the shipping market is often used as textbook examples of perfect 
competitive markets. For instance, if there are many vessels available in the market and the 
demand for these vessels are low, the rates will go down. Contrary, if the supply of vessels is 
low, rates goes up. Once freight rates are set, both shipowners and charterers make adjustments 
so that the supply and demand eventually comes in balance. When studying the freight rate 
mechanism it is therefore important to consider three different aspects; the supply function, the 
demand function and the equilibrium price.  
                                                 
2 European Economic Community 
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2.3.1 Supply function 
The supply function for one individual vessel is shown in exhibit 2.2. The supply curve is shaped 
as a J-curve, describing the relationship between freight rates and tonne miles transported per 
annum. 
 
Exhibit 2.2: Supply function for an individual vessel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Stopford, 2009) 
The J-formed curve shows that the operating speed will lie between a maximum and minimum 
speed, depending on the freight rate. As freight rates go up, shipowners will increase the vessels 
operating speed, and reduce it as rates decline. This change in operating speed will have an 
immediate effect on the total supply of vessels. Note that if the freight rates get below the 
minimum speed line, the ship is typically put into lay-up.  
 
The next step is to illustrate how the market adjusts when implementing supply provided by a 
fleet of vessels. The supply function for a fleet is built up based on the supply curves for each 
individual vessel, exhibits 2.3. Some of the vessels are older and less efficient than others. This is 
reflected in the different supply curves where the most efficient vessels are presented by the 
curves to the left. The supply function for a fleet adjusts vessels in and out of lay-up in response 
to fright rates. If freight rates fall below the operating costs of a vessel, it goes into lay-up and the 
supply is reduced by one vessel. The slope of the short-term supply curve is dependent on three 
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factors determining the lay-up of the marginal vessel. These are the age, transportation cost and 
the relationship between speed and freight rates. First, older vessels generally have higher 
operating cost. Second, larger vessels have lower transportation cost per tonne of cargo than 
smaller vessels. Hence, as rates are low, larger vessels tends to drive smaller vessels into lay-up 
when they are competing for the same cargo. Third, the relationship between speed and freight 
rates will be discussed more in depth in section 4.2.4.3. 
 
Exhibit 2.3: Supply function for a fleet 
 
Source: (Stopford, 2009) 
 
2.3.2 Demand function 
The demand function shows how the demand changes as the freight rates changes. The curve is 
almost vertical, seen in exhibit 2.4. This is mainly due to lack of competing transportation 
options. Charters need to transport their goods, regardless of the price. This is why the curve is to 
be considered as almost inelastic. A charterer will not take on an extra vessel just because the 
freight rate goes down. In addition, the freight rate only account for a small portion of material 
costs.  
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Exhibit 2.4: Demand function for vessels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Stopford, 2009) 
 
2.3.3 The equilibrium 
The equilibrium is met when the shipowner and charterer have found a mutually acceptable price. 
In reality, the price that the seller and buyer agree upon depends on how much time they have to 
adjust their positions. This means that in general there are three main time variables to consider, 
momentary equilibrium, the short run-equilibrium and the long run equilibrium. 
 
2.3.3.1 Momentary equilibrium 
In the momentary equilibrium there are deals in the market that has to be made right away. 
Shipowners can either fix on the offered rate, or wait for better times and in the meantime lose 
money. In such a short time frame, the shipping market is highly fragmented and falls into small 
regions. Meaning that excess supply in one region cannot be utilized elsewhere. The equilibrium 
is described in the exhibit 2.5 below. In the first case there are more vessels than demand, showed 
by the D1 curve. In this situation, the alternative to fixing is earning nothing. Thus, rates fall 
down to operating costs. If instead it is excess of cargo, shown by the D2 curve, the charterer 
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must bid for vessels. The increased demand will lead to significantly higher freight rates. Note 
that this can be seen as an auction where sentiment is often the driver in this short-term market. 
 
Exhibit 2.5: Momentary equilibrium  
  
Source: (Stopford, 2009) 
 
2.3.3.2 The short-run equilibrium 
The short-run equilibrium differ from the momentary equilibrium as shipowners and charterers 
have time to adjust supply by short-term measures such as lay-ups, reactivation, combined 
carriers switching markets or operating speed. The short-run equilibrium is shown in exhibit 2.6. 
 
With low demand, D1, the freight rate settles at a low point. Here the least efficient vessels are 
laid up and the fleet is slow steaming. In the short run, a significant increase in demand, moving 
the demand curve to D2, may not have a large effect on the freight rates. This is because fleets 
will be adjusted, as more vessels will be taken out of lay-up and into service. In addition, the 
operating speed will be increased. A further increase in demand, D3, will have a large effect on 
the freight rates, as it is limited how much further the fleet can adjust. 
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Exhibit 2.6: Short-run equilibrium 
 
Source: (Stopford, 2009) 
 
2.3.3.3 The long run 
In the long run, shipowners have time to deliver new vessels and scrap old ones and charterers 
have time to rearrange their supply sources. Supply and demand are adjusted through four 
different markets; the freight market, the new buildings market, the secondhand sales market and 
the demolition market. It is typical for a shipowner to trade in all of the four markets, which 
means that the markets are closely correlated. The center of the four markets is the balance sheet 
to a shipowner, and it is the cash flows that decide the business cycles.  
 
The main source of cash inflow comes from the freight market, through time charter voyage 
charter and freight derivatives. Shipowners will also have cash inflow from the demolition 
market if they decide to scrap their vessels. As for the second-hand market, it does not lead to 
either in or out flow of cash, but is rather a re-allocation of cash. The main source of cash outflow 
comes from the new building market, as shipyards will use these cash to finance material, labor 
and profits.  
 
Contrary, rising freight rates increases the cash inflow to the shipowners, and allows them to pay 
higher prices for second-hand vessels. The price for these vessels will increase up to a given point 
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where the new building market seems better valued. Due to high freight rates, it seems profitable 
for them to increase their fleet, and the number of ordered new buildings rises. When these 
vessels are delivered the total fleet increases. This will subsequently lead to oversupply and 
falling freight rates. Then, financially weak shipowners will be forced to sell their vessels on the 
second-hand market to meet their obligations. Secondly, this will also affect older vessels 
available for sale in the second hand market as these might not get any offers, and has to be sold 
for scrapping. As more vessels are scrapped, the supply fall, which in turn will lead to increased 
freight rates. The whole process will then start over again. 
 
2.4 Contracts 
In the freight market there exist four main contractual agreements. These are; the voyage charter, 
the time charter, the contract of affreightment, and the bare boat charter. 
 
In a voyage charter the shipowner provides transport between two ports, and receives a fixed 
price per tonne. The contract may be for one or more voyages, and the terms will be stated in a 
charter party3. In a voyage charter all costs are paid by the shipowner, here under capital costs, 
operating costs, port costs, bunkers cost and canal dues. 
 
With a time charter the charterer takes control of the vessel for the time to complete a single 
voyage (trip charter) or for a period of months or years (time charter). The charterer has complete 
operational control over the vessel, and pays all voyage expenses, leaving capital and operating 
costs to the shipowner. Time charter contracts over a longer period are often used as collateral for 
loans used to purchase the needed vessel.  
 
The contract of affreightment is an agreement to supply cargo on a specific route for a certain 
number of times at a fixed interval. This allows the shipowner to plan the use of his vessels in the 
most efficient manner. The contract has the same cost profile as voyage charter 
 
                                                 
3 Charter party; a contract between a shipowner and a merchant, by which a ship is let or hired for transport of goods 
on a specified voyage, or period. 
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A bare boat charter is an agreement where the charterer has full control of the ship, without 
owning the vessel. Under these arrangements the investor is often a financial institution that 
purchases the vessel and hand it over to the charterer on long contracts, often between 10-20 
years. The charterer pays all cost except capital cost. 
 
2.5 Risk in shipping 
Shipowners and other parties in the shipping sector are exposed to numerous risk factors. In 
general, the value of a company depends on its expected net cash flow from operations. 
Therefore, any factors that might have a negative impact on the cash flow can be identified as a 
risk. In this section we will highlight the most important risk factors, and how these affect 
shipping companies. The section will be based on Alizadeh & Nomikos (2009). 
 
2.5.1 Price risk 
Price risk refers to possible negative impacts on the cash flow due to changes in input and output 
prices. Input prices refer to changes in the price that the firm has to pay for labor, raw materials 
etc. Whereas, output prices refer to level of price that firms can claim for its goods and services.  
 
The most important risk factor for shipping companies is perhaps the risk associated with 
changes in freight rates. As described earlier, freight rates are very volatile and have a direct 
impact on profitability. Volatility on the cost side is also affecting the profitability, especially 
bunker costs as they on average account for more than 50 percent of the total voyage costs. 
Bunker prices are closely related to world oil prices, which are volatile both in the short and long 
term.  
 
Other price risks are fluctuations in interest rates, currency risk and asset price risk. The shipping 
sector is very capital intensive, and most vessels are financed through loans with floating interest 
rates. Consequently,  only  small  changes  in  interest  rates  can  have  a  large  impact  on  a  company’s  
profit margin. Also, currency risk might occur if freight income has to be converted into a 
different currency. Finally, asset price risk refers to fluctuations in the value of vessels. This is 
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important   as   it   affects   the   balance   sheet   and   may   affect   the   company’s   creditworthiness,   as  
vessels are used as collaterals in transactions. 
 
2.5.2 Credit risk 
In shipping most agreements are negotiated directly between counterparties. Credit risk is the 
uncertainty whether the counter-party fulfills his financial obligations as initially agreed. 
Examples of such agreements are time charter contracts between a shipowner and a charterer, 
new building agreements between a shipowner and a shipyard, freight derivatives transaction 
between  two  investors  etc.  In  each  of  these  cases  the  parties  are  exposed  to  each  other’s  ability  to  
fulfill the contract. 
 
2.5.3 Pure risk 
Pure risk can be defined as the reduction in the value of assets, due to physical damage, accidents 
or losses (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2009). In shipping pure risk includes factors such as risk of 
collision, loss of vessels or liability from oil or chemical spillage. In contrast to other risk factors, 
pure   risk   has   the   potential   of   having   a   large   and   sudden   impact   on   the   company’s   value.   The  
frequency  and  severity  of  pure  risk  can  be  influenced  by  the  company’s  actions.  For  example,  the  
probability of oil spill is smaller for a modern vessel, than a hulk from  the  1980’s.   
 
2.5.4 How to manage risk? 
Alizadeh and Nomikos (2009) identify four important reasons for why shipping companies 
should manage risk, which are bankruptcy costs, capital structure and the cost of capital, benefits 
for public listed companies and taxes.4 
 
In shipping there are various instruments for risk reduction. For instance, reduction in price risk 
can be done through different derivatives, either shipping specific or financial derivatives. 
Derivatives are financial instruments, which derive its value from the value of underlying entities, 
such as an asset or index. Derivatives will be thorough discussed in chapter 3. Credit risk can be 
                                                 
4 For in depth information see (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2009) 
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managed through collateralization, downgrade triggers, contract design and credit derivatives. 
Collateralization means that the party exposed to credit risk takes some sort of collateral, for 
instance a valuable asset or a letter of credit. Downgrade triggers means that a party can close out 
or change the agreement if it is   a   downgrade   in   the   counterparty’s   creditworthiness.   Contract  
design refers to the possibility to design the contract in a way that it incorporates for default and 
non-performance compensations. Typically, pure risk is managed through insurance contracts. 
 
Christoffersen (2003) showed that companies implementing risk management strategies tend to 
outperform comparative companies not managing their risk. His study also reveals that in 
general, larger firms tend to manage risk more actively than smaller firms. This might be due to 
the fact that smaller firms only have limited access to derivative markets and lack the expertise 
(Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2009).  
 
 
2.6 The Baltic Exchange 
The Baltic Exchange first opened in 1744, as a coffee house where people met to make 
arrangements and draw up agreements for the transportation of goods by sea (The Baltic 
Exchange, 2013). It was not until the early 1980s they realized that risk management techniques 
applied in commodity and financial markets could be developed and applied for risk management 
in shipping, and the first daily freight index was published in May 1985 (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 
2009). Today, the Baltic Exchange is the only independent source of maritime market 
information for trading and settling physical and derivative contracts. Hence, the Baltic Exchange 
plays an important role in the market by reporting the spot prices on each specific route. In 
addition, the exchange also develops and constructs different indices showing the development 
within different segments.  
 
The Baltic exchange reports freight rates for all major routes for both the wet and dry bulk 
market. These rates are calculated on a daily basis, and are reported in the market 1 pm London 
time. The Baltic Exchange is able to deliver data because of its network of independent brokers, 
who report the freight on various routes. These freight rates are based on actual fixing in the 
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market. In the absence of fixing, the shipbroker report what he considers a likely price if the 
fixing had taken place. The assessments are based on exact route definitions detailed by the 
Manual for Panellists produced by the Baltic Exchange. The manual includes definitions on 
variables such as route- and vessel specifications. Table 2.6.1 summarizes the voyage charter 
routes specified in the manual of panellists for the Capesize segment. 
  
Table 2.3: Voyage charter routes 
Name of 
route 
Route 
Loading capacity 
(dwt) 
Turn time load/discharge 
(in hours) 
Maximum age 
(years) 
C2 Tubarao/ Rotterdam 160,000 6/6 18 
C3 Tubarao/Qingdao 160,000 6/24 18 
C4 
Richards 
Bay/Rotterdam 
150,000 18/12 15 
C5 West Australia/Qingdao 160,000 or 170,000 6/24 18 
C7 Bolivar/Rotterdam 150,000 12/12 15 
The table shows voyage charter routes specified by the Baltic Exchange in the Manual for Panellists 
Source: (The Baltic Exchange, 2012) 
 
Time charter routes are non-standardized routes. The Manual for Panellists only presents a 
delivery and redelivery range, rather than a specific route. All data presented are based on a 
vessel referred to as Baltic standard vessel. This vessel has a capacity of 172,000 dwt, fuel 
consumption of 56 tonne per day at the design speed of 14.5 laden or 15 knots ballast. Based on 
the design speed, delivery- and redelivery range the Manual for Panellists specify an expected 
duration for the voyage. This is defined as round voyage duration. The routes are presented in 
table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: Time charter routes 
Route Delivery range Redelivery range Dwt Duration 
Speed 
(laden/ballast)  
Fuel con. 
Maximum 
age 
C08_03 
Gibraltar-
Hamburg 
Gibraltar-Hamburg 172,000 30-45 14.5/15.0 knots 56 tonne/day 10 
C09_03 
Amsterdam-
Rotterdam-
Antwerp 
Amsterdam-Rotterdam-
Antwerp 
172,000 About 65 14.5/15.0 knots 56 tonne/day 10 
C10_03 China-Japan China-Japan 172,000 30-40 14.5/15.0 knots 56 tonne/day 10 
C11_03 China-Japan 
Amsterdam-Rotterdam-
Antwerp range or passing 
Passero 
172,000 About 65 14.5/15.0 knots 56 tonne/day 10 
The table shows time charter routes specified by the Baltic Exchange in the Manual for Panellists  
Source: (The Baltic Exchange, 2012) 
 
The Baltic exchange also reports data on indices that are based on weighted averages of major 
routes for each segment. The composition of these routes is occasionally updated, reflecting 
trends and developments in the freight market. As for the dry bulk trade the Baltic Dry Index, 
BDI, is widely used as the market indicator. This index is calculated as the equally weighted 
average of indices on the Capesize, Panamax, Supramax and Handysize segment. In the Capesize 
segment the Baltic Capesize Index, BCI, are used as a market indicator. This index is an average 
of the four time charter routes, where the routes are equally weighted.
 
 
 
 31 
3. Risk management 
In section 2.5 we discussed different risk factors in the shipping industry, and explained how 
some of them could be managed by derivatives. This chapter will take that discussion one step 
further and elaborate on derivatives in general and shipping specific. First we will provide a 
theoretical background on forward contracts and basis risk. Later we will provide two 
frameworks to measure hedging performance that can be used to evaluate the similarity between 
the Baltic Capesize Index and actual Capesize earnings.  
 
3.1 Forward contracts 
Rising price volatility has led to a number of specialized financial instruments that allow 
participants to hedge against unexpected price movement. A common way to manage such risk is 
by using derivative contracts. A derivative is a contract for a transaction whose value depends or 
derives from the values of other more basic underlying variables. Derivatives specify the terms of 
a transaction in the future, and examples of derivatives are forwards, futures, swaps and options. 
This section will give an introduction to forward contracts, and are based on Hull (2012). 
 
A forward contract is an agreement to buy or sell an asset at a certain time in the future, for a 
certain price. In a forward contract there are two parties that have opposite positions. One party 
enters a long position, which means that he has agreed to buy the asset for a certain price at a 
certain time in the future. The counter-party enters a short position, which means that he agrees to 
sell the asset for a certain price at a certain time in the future. Both parties are obliged to fulfill 
their obligations. The initial value of a forward contract is equal to zero, and nothing changes 
hands before maturity. It is usually settled in cash, but it can also be settled physically. Forward 
contracts are usually traded over-the-counter, which means that they are traded over a network of 
dealers instead of a centralized exchange. A key advantage of over-the-counter trading is that the 
contract terms do not have to be those specified by an exchange. Forward contracts can therefore 
be tailor made.  
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For descriptive purposes consider the following example. A shipowner has studied historical fuel 
prices and is convinced that he has found a pattern that implies rising spot prices in the near 
future. Therefore, he enters a forward contract to reduce his risk. The contract counterparty is a 
fuel producer, who is, in contrast to the shipowner, afraid of falling spot prices. By entering a 
forward contract they can both remove their underlying price risk in fuel. The spot price of a 
metric tonne of fuel today, S0, is $550. The shipowner enters a long position in the forward 
contract with a settlement price of $570 per metric tonne at time 1, F0,1. 
 
At time 1 the spot price on fuel has raised to $600 per metric tonne, S1. Because of the forward 
contract the shipowner is obliged to buy the fuel for $570 per metric tonne. In general the payoff 
of a long position can be written as 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓௅௢௡௚  ௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡ = 𝑆௧ − 𝐹଴,௧     ( 1 ) 
 
In the example, the shipowner earns a payoff of $30 per metric tonne, as he can bunker his vessel 
for $570 per tonne instead of the spot price at $600. Similarly, the producer has a negative payoff 
of $30 per tonne, as he alternatively could have sold his fuel at the spot price of $600 per metric 
tonne. In general, the payoff from a short position in a forward contract is 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓ௌ௛௢௥௧  ௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡ = 𝐹଴,௧ − 𝑆௧     ( 2 ) 
 
Even though the fuel producer had a negative payoff, he was guaranteed that the shipowner 
would bunker his vessel at time 1 for the agreed forward price. Similarly, the shipowner was 
guaranteed the price he could bunker his vessel for. This shows that both the shipowner and the 
fuel producer are perfectly hedged and knew exactly what their cash flow would be at time 1. 
 
3.1.1 Pricing forward contracts 
When considering forward contracts it is important to distinguish between consumption assets, 
investment assets and non-storable assets. A consumption asset is an asset primarily held for 
consumption, like pork bellies and corn, while an investment asset is primarily held for 
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investment, like stocks and bonds. Note that some assets may not be held exclusively for 
investment, for instance both silver and gold can be held for both investment and consumption 
purposes. A requirement to be regarded as an investment asset is that the asset is held by a large 
number of investors solely for investment purposes. Non-storable assets are assets that cannot be 
stored or carried forward in time. 
 
3.1.1.1 Investment assets 
In general, the price of a forward contract on investment asset with a known yield is given by the 
formula 
 
𝐹଴,் = 𝑆଴𝑒(௥ିఋ)் ( 3 ) 
 
Where S0 is  the  spot  price  on  the  underlying  asset,  r  is  the  risk  free  rate,  δ  is  the  dividend  yield,  T  
is the time to maturity and F0,T is the forward price with maturity at time T. The price of a 
forward contract is based on a concept known as replication. The idea of replication is that the 
price of the derivative should be the cost of creating the same outcome synthetically. Table 3.1 
shows one out of many ways to replicate a forward contract. 
 
Table 3.1: Replication of a long forward position 
 t = 0 t = T 
Long Forward 0 𝑆் − 𝐹଴,் 
Buy S0 −𝑆଴𝑒ିఋ௧ 𝑆் 
Borrow 𝑆଴𝑒ିఋ௧ −𝑆଴𝑒(௥ିఋ)௧ 
Cash flow 0 𝑆் − 𝑆଴𝑒(௥ିఋ)௧ 
Source: Hull (2012) 
 
For the replicated portfolio to have an initial value of zero, the investment in the underlying asset 
is financed through debt. Since there are continuous dividend payments, new shares are 
constantly purchased. At time T, the underlying asset is sold and the debt is repaid with interests. 
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The derivative and its replicating portfolio lead to identical outcomes, so under no arbitrage 
condition they must have the same cost. Hence, 
 
 𝑆் − 𝐹଴,் =    𝑆் − 𝑆଴𝑒(௥ିఋ)௧   ⇔   𝐹଴,் =    𝑆଴𝑒(௥ିఋ)௧  ( 4 ) 
 
If  𝐹0,𝑇 > 𝑆0𝑒(𝑟−𝛿)𝑇, it is an arbitrage opportunity as the forward contract is overvalued. Arbitrageurs 
can then buy the asset and short forward contracts on the underlying asset. Alternatively  𝐹0,𝑇 <
𝑆0𝑒
(𝑟−𝛿)𝑇, the forward contract is undervalued and arbitrageurs can short the asset and enter a long 
forward contract. 
 
3.1.1.2 Consumption assets 
Forward contracts on consumption assets are priced based on the same intuition as investment 
assets. Though, they are a bit more complicated as they are often subject to storage costs and 
have a convenience yield. Convenience yield is the benefit associated with holding the 
underlying asset, rather than the contract or derivative product. Mathematically, the price of these 
forward contracts can be expressed as 
 
𝐹଴,் = 𝑆଴𝑒(௥ା௨ି௬)் ( 5 ) 
 
Where u is the storage cost in proportion of the underlying asset, and y is the convenience yield. 
All other factors are the same as stated above. To see if the equation holds for consumption 
assets, we must consider the same two arbitrage situations, over- and undervaluation. If the 
forward contract are overvalued, 𝐹଴,் > 𝑆଴𝑒(௥ା௨ି௬)், arbitrageurs can take advantage of the situation 
by purchasing the asset and short the forward contract. According to basic economic theory, 
overvaluation will lead to decreased demand for the overvalued asset and increased demand for 
the undervalued asset. In time, equilibrium will be restored as the price for the undervalued asset 
increases and the price for the overvalued asset are reduced.  
 
If a forward contract is undervalued, 𝐹଴,் < 𝑆଴𝑒(௥ା௨ି௬)், arbitrageurs can sell the asset and take a 
long position in the forward contract. However, since the asset is primarily held for consumption, 
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they will be reluctant to do so. Hence, they will not sell the commodity in the spot market and 
buy forward contracts, as it will be used in production or consumed in any other way. Therefore, 
it is no reason for why the price of a forward contract for consumption commodities cannot be 
 
𝐹଴,் ≤ 𝑆଴𝑒(௥ା௨ି௬)் ( 6 ) 
 
3.1.1.3 Non-storable assets 
Spot and future prices for financial and commodity markets are related through the cost-of-carry 
relationship. This is a no-arbitrage condition linking the spot and forward prices for commodities 
that can be stored and carried forward in time. In contrast to consumption assets, Kavussanos 
(2002) and Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004, 2006) points outs that freight services are non-
storable. Another example of a non-storable commodity is electricity. Such commodities are not 
practical to store or carry forward in time. Therefore, the forward contract and the underlying 
asset are not linked through a no-arbitrage condition, but rather by market expectations regarding 
spot prices at maturity. The prices today of a forward contract for delivery at time T equals the 
spot price that the market agent expects to apply at maturity. Mathematically this relationship can 
be expressed as 
 
𝑭𝐭,𝑻 = 𝑬(𝑺𝐓|𝛀𝒕)     ( 7 ) 
 
where 𝐸(𝑆୘|Ω௧) is the conditional expectations operator at time t. Ω௧ is the information set 
available to market participants at the same time, conditional on which the expectation is 
computed. This pricing relationship is referred to as the unbiasedness hypothesis, as it imply that 
forward prices are unbiased predictors of the realized spot price and, on average, the forecast 
error from forward contracts will be zero (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2009). The unbiasedness 
hypothesis will be explained in depth in section 3.2.2.1. 
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3.2 Freight derivatives 
Within finance, derivatives have been used for risk management for a long time and are now 
much bigger than the stock market measured in terms of the underlying asset. However, it is only 
during the last decade derivatives have been used consistently in shipping.  
 
Freight derivatives are hedging instruments that are developed to enable shipowners to hedge 
their exposure to freight market risk. Traditionally shipowners have managed risk through time 
chartering, but freight derivatives may prove to be a better alternative for risk management. First 
of all, it is more efficient as shipowners retain operational control of the ship, and can at the same 
time benefit from spot market conditions. Secondly, the commissions from trading in freight 
derivatives are lower compared to chartering agreements. Thirdly, it is easier to trade in and out 
of freight derivative positions compared to physical positions. Lastly, there is no physical 
delivery with freight derivatives, as they are settled in cash. Freight derivatives are also useful for 
other parties that want to have shipping exposure, such as commodity traders, financial 
institutions, oil companies, or other investors that want a different cycle. (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 
2008) 
 
Today there exist mainly two types of freight derivatives, forward freight agreements (FFA) and 
freight options. This section will only elaborate on forward freight agreements, as freight options 
are not relevant for this dissertation. For in depth information on other freight derivatives see 
Kavussanos & Visvikis (2008) or Stopford (2009). 
 
3.2.1 Forward freight agreement   
The first freight derivative product was the Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange 
(BIFFEX) contract, traded in the London International Financial Futures and Option Exchange 
(LIFFE) from May 1985 until April 2002. The underlying asset was the Baltic Freight Index 
(BFI). Kavussanos (2002) showed that BIFFEX contracts did not produce effective hedges. In 
1992, over-the-counter FFA contracts were introduced and this reduced the trade in the BIFFEX 
contract. The BIFFEX contract was eventually withdrawn from the trading floor in April 2002.  
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FFA contracts are currently used in the dry and wet bulk sector of shipping, with major routes or 
indices serving as the underlying asset. At first there were little to no liquidity in the market, but 
this has changed heavily over the last decade, both in number of contracts and in value. The 
market was estimated to be worth $150 billion in 2008, but has according to market estimates 
fallen to around $8 billion to $12 billion in 2012 (Reuters, 2013). An important driver behind the 
rapid growth the last decade is the interest from players outside the shipping markets. There has 
been an influx of new participants such as hedge funds and investment banks, attracted by the 
market volatility. (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2009) 
 
FFA is principal-to-principal contracts for difference5 between a seller and a buyer. The contracts 
are settled monthly and like other forward contracts they are traded over-the-counter. Currently 
there are two types of FFA contracts; voyage and time charter based contracts. Voyage charter 
contracts are based on a certain trading route, and are given on a $/ tonne basis. The settlement 
price on these contracts is the average of the last seven working days of the month. The time 
charter contracts are based on the four time charter routes6 and given on $/day basis. The 
settlement price on these contracts is the average price over the entire month. The contracts are 
traded in blocks of months, quarters or years. There is no physical delivery of the underlying 
asset, but rather a cash settlement. Hence, the parties are betting on the future direction of freight 
rates. (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2008) 
 
The following example can illustrate their usage. Consider a shipowner who wants to lock in a 
rate for his vessel in 2013 in order to protect himself from falling freight rates the following year. 
Since the shipowner is long in tonnage, he enters a short position in FFA contracts at the 
beginning of January. Hence, the shipowner keeps control of the vessel and plays the spot market 
for a year. At the same time he sells a one-year FFA contract based on the four time charter 
average for Capesize vessels. The charterer is short in tonnage, so he goes long in FFAs in order 
to fix his freight costs. Both parties offset a risk exposure in the real physical market by an equal 
                                                 
5 Contract for difference: Contracts between a seller and a buyer, where the seller pays the difference between the 
current asset value and the contracted value.  
6 See table 2.4 
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and opposite, and usually simultaneous, paper transaction in the FFA market. If any monthly 
settlements are below the agreed price the shipowner will be paid the difference, and vice-versa. 
 
If we for illustrative purposes assume that the FFA price is $10,000 per day and that the average 
of January 2013 was $8,000. Then, the shipowner is due ($10,000 − $8,000) ∗ 31  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 =
$62,000. Physical earnings on the spot market will balance these monthly cash flows. 
 
3.2.2 Price discoveries 
Compared to other derivatives, there has been relatively little research on freight derivatives 
compared to the equity market. Most of the research that has been conducted is concentrated on 
its economic functions, like price discovery and hedging effectiveness. This can be explained by 
the fact that if derivatives do not perform their basic function, there is no reason to trade in them.  
 
3.2.2.1 The unbiasedness hypothesis 
As mentioned before, FFA contracts are non-storable. Thus, the forward prices are driven by 
expectations of market agents regarding the spot prices that will prevail at the maturity of the 
contract. Kavussanos and Visvikis (2002, 2004 and 2006) studied the relationship between 
current forward and expected spot prices. Their research showed that forward prices are unbiased 
forecasts of the spot price that will be realized at maturity (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2008). 
Mathematically, this relationship can be expressed as 
 
𝐹௧,் = 𝐸(𝑆௧) + 𝑢௧            ;         𝑢௧~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎ଶ)  ( 8 ) 
 
Where, Ft,T, is the price for an FFA contract settled at time t with maturity at time T. E(St) is the 
expected value of spot at the settlement date and ut is an independent and identically stochastic 
error-term with mean equal to zero and variance σ2. This price relationship is called the 
unbiasedness hypothesis.  
 
The concept of the unbiasedness essentially implies that, over a long period of time, the average 
forecast error from FFAs would be zero. This means that FFA prices will not consistently over- 
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or under estimate the underlying spot market. However, FFA contracts will not necessarily have 
the most accurate estimate for forecasting the expected spot price. FFA contracts tend to produce 
forecasts that, on average across a large number of observations, are not consistently biased. 
Therefore, the forward curve for FFA contracts contains useful information about the current 
sentiment and the future direction of the market. (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2009) 
 
Since information about the future is invaluable, several studies have been made to test the 
unbiasedness hypothesis. For instance, Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004) tested the hypothesis 
with a least square regression model, under the assumptions that there is no risk premium and 
rational use of information. Given these assumptions, a forward contract will then theoretically be 
equivalent to the spot price at maturity. This relationship can be empirically tested using the 
following formula  
 
𝑆௧ = 𝛽ଵ + 𝛽ଶ ∗ 𝐹௧,௧ି௡ + 𝑢௧      ;       𝑢௧~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎ଶ) ( 9 ) 
 
Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004) argue that unbiasedness depends on the market and the 
type/length of the contract under investigation. Unbiasedness holds when the following parameter 
restrictions 𝛽ଵ = 0 and  𝛽ଶ = 1 are valid. The hypothesis was tested on different Panamax trading 
routes, and indicated that FFA contracts one and two months prior to maturity are unbiased 
predictors of the realized spot price. FFA contracts with three months to maturity was unbiased 
predictors only on certain Panamax routes, hence P27 and P2A8. For routes where the 
unbiasedness hypothesis holds, decision makers can use FFA prices as indicators of future spot 
prices.  
 
Ishizaka et al. (2007) examined how several different factors affecting equilibrium in both spot 
and future/forward rates in the shipping market, assuming non-storability of freight rates. They 
took an equilibrium approach for deriving future/forward rates, rather than a cost-of-carry 
relationship. They constructed a forward curve from wet bulk data and examined the 
                                                 
7 P2 is based on a Panamax vessel with loading capacity of 54,000dwt sailing HSS US Gulf/ Japan 
8 P2A is based on a Panamax vessel with a loading capacity of 74,000dwt, with a basis delivery Skaw- Gibraltar 
range, for a trip to the Far East redelivery Taiwan-Japan range. (The Baltic Exchange, 2012) 
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unbiasedness hypothesis. By using the futures curves, they examined if there are any differences 
between the predicted values and the futures prices at maturity when market structure and 
conditions differ. Note that under the assumption of deterministic interest rates, future and 
forward prices are equal. At maturity, observed futures curve and risk-premium curve indicated 
biasedness in all market conditions. Starting at a low demand state, the slopes of the future curve 
are downwards and the risk-premium curves tend to be upward sloping. Contrary, as demand is 
starting at a high point, the future curve tends to be upwards sloping and the risk-premium tends 
to be decreasing. Their results suggest that in a period of high demand, market participants 
believe that the present period is more important than the future period. This is why negative risk-
premiums might exist for the future9. In general, in a period with low demand, each participant 
values the future higher compared to the present period, and vice-versa. 
 
Goulas and Skiadopolous (2011) performed a similar analysis as Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004) 
on various major freight indices. Their analysis concluded that there exists positive risk premium 
in the freight futures market. This implies that the unbiasedness hypothesis does not hold for 
IMAREX and questions the price discovery role of freight future prices (Goulas & Skiadopoulos, 
2011). 
 
3.2.2.2 Lead-lag relationship 
The lead-lag relationship describes the relationship of return and volatility between FFA 
contracts and the spot freight market. Kavussanos and Visvikis (2008) proved that FFA contracts 
are leading the underlying spot market. This might be due to the fact that FFA trades are cash-
settled. Therefore, the transaction cost for FFA contracts is lower than the underlying spot 
market. In addition, investors might have several different FFA contracts on one or more of the 
trading routes for different time intervals, providing ease of shorting. On the contrary, spot 
fixtures require greater initial costs and take longer time to complete. This is why market agents 
react faster to new information through the FFA market, compared to the spot market. One can 
therefore observe that spot prices will lag behind FFA prices. (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2008) 
                                                 
9 Conversely, in a period of low demand, market participants believe that the future period is more important than 
the present period. This is why positive risk-premiums might exist for the future 
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3.3 Basis risk 
Basis in a hedging situation can be described as the difference between the spot price and the 
derivative contract that is being used. If the asset to be hedged and the asset underlying the 
derivative contract are the same, the basis has a tendency to converge to zero at maturity. 
Though, as maturity approaches they might have different price changes depending on the 
correlation between them. If for instance the spot price and derivative price always changes by 
the same amount, they are perfectly correlated and the basis will not change. (Hull, 2012) 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡  𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 ( 10 ) 
 
In practice, the basis is seldom equal to zero, and the correlation is different from 1. For instance, 
the asset to be hedged may not be exactly the same as the asset underlying the forward contract, 
or the hedger may be uncertain as to when the asset will be bought or sold in the future. There 
might also be a requirement to close the derivative position prior to delivery. In these cases, the 
basis will differ from zero. When the basis differs from zero, it is referred to as basis risk. There 
are several factors that might increase the basis risk, for instance storage costs, interest costs and 
transportation costs. Note  that  basis  risk  can  lead  to  an  improvement  or  worsening  of  a  hedger’s  
position.  As  an  example,  consider  a  short  hedge.  If  the  basis  increases  unexpectedly,  the  hedger’s  
position improves. Contrary, if the basis decreases unexpectedly,  the  hedger’s  position  worsens.  
For a long hedge, the reverse holds. (Hull, 2012) 
 
Mathematically basis risk can be expressed as  
 
𝜎ଶ(∆𝐵௧) = 𝜎ଶ൫∆𝑆௧ − ∆𝐹௧,்൯ = 𝜎ଶ(∆𝑆௧) + 𝜎ଶ൫∆𝐹௧,்൯ − 2𝜌ௌ,ி𝜎(∆𝑆௧)𝜎൫∆𝐹௧,்൯ ( 11 ) 
 
Equation 11 shows that the basis risk between spot and a forward contract is determined by the 
standard deviation of changes in spot-, ∆𝑆௧, and future, ∆𝐹௧,், price and the correlation between 
them, 𝜌ௌ,ி. This is consistent with Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006b), claiming that basis risk is 
mainly determined by the correlation coefficient. In practice this means that if the basis risk is 
high, the correlation coefficient is low.  
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3.3.1. Contango and backwardation 
Depending on the sign of the basis, the market is either categorized as in contango or 
backwardation. For instance, if the basis is negative, the spot forward price is higher than the spot 
price, and we say that the market is in contango. Conversely, if the basis is positive then the 
contract is in backwardation. These terms are also used to describe the entire shape of the forward 
curve. When the forward curve is falling, forward prices decrease as time to maturity increases, it 
is said to be in backwardation. Contrary, a rising forward curve is said to be in contango.  In 
exhibit 3.1, both situations are presented, assuming that the spot price remains constant. This 
assumption will not hold in practice, as both S and F will fluctuate as we approach maturity.  
 
Exhibit 3.1: Forward price in contango and backwardation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2009) 
 
3.4 Basis risk in shipping 
In general, basis risk is a result of hedging with imperfect substitutes. This is also the case for the 
shipping industry, and any difference between actual earnings and BCI may be explained by basis 
risks. In this section we will elaborate on the most important sources of physical basis risk in 
shipping. 
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3.4.1 Technical specifications 
The basis risk technical specifications are due to technical difference between an actual vessel 
and the vessel that FFA contracts are based on, the Baltic standard vessel. The Baltic standard 
vessel is used as a reference when the Baltic exchange comprises rates on the four time charter 
routes. In reality, the Capesize fleet today consists of numerous of vessels, each with different 
specifications. Consequently, a Capesize vessel might differ strongly from these standard 
specifications. Especially important are the cargo size, design speed and fuel consumption, as 
these affect actual earnings.  
 
The vessel segmentation in the dry bulk sector is rather wide and, as earlier mentioned, a vessel is 
categorized as a Capesize if it has a deadweight tonnage above 100,000. A physical vessel might 
therefore transport significantly more or less cargo than a standard vessel, which yields complete 
different earnings potential. Vessels might also have different fuel consumption and design speed 
than the standard vessel. For example, newer vessels tend to be far more fuel-efficient than older 
counterparts, and have therefore lower bunker costs. Difference in design speed may influence 
the time spent on a voyage. Note that design speed often differs from the actual operating speed 
(Ådland, 2013). Shipowners tend to sail at a much lower speed than the design speed (slow 
steaming), in order to obtain lower fuel consumption. More on this subject will be described in 
section 4.2.4.3. When these specifications deviate they are all a source of basis risk.  
 
3.4.2 Geography 
For the hedger it is best to select an FFA route that has strong correlation with the physical 
exposure. The optimal choice of contract would be an FFA contract based on the exact same 
route as the underlying. Though, contracts are seldom to be found on one specific route due to 
poor liquidity. As mentioned, the shipowner might be forced to hedge with FFA contracts based 
on the four time charter average. Such contracts are based on spot rates from both the Atlantic 
and Pacific basin. In addition, it is not common to hedge certain voyages, but rather on a year-to-
year basis. Thus, there might be large deviations between the hedged voyage and the routes 
underlying the FFA contract. 
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As an example, consider a vessel operating in the Pacific basin. The vessel transports iron ore 
between China and Western Australia, obtaining regional freight rates. The shipowner hedges his 
vessel with a FFA contract based on the four time charter average. Consequently, the shipowner 
hedges earnings from the Pacific basin with a contract that is partially based on rates from other 
geographical regions. The inability to hedge with a tailor-made FFA contract for the same 
geographical area leads to a hedge with an imperfect substitute, and are hence a source of basis 
risk. 
 
A possibility to reduce the basis risk is to hedge with FFA contracts based on voyage charter 
routes, hence C2, C3 etc. The liquidity on these FFA contracts is poor, but considered to be better 
than for FFA contracts based on a specific time charter route. This means that a shipowner can 
hedge his ship with FFA contracts that are based on the same geographical area. This will 
naturally reduce the amount of basis risk due to geography. A problem here is that you reduce 
one source of basis risk, by adding another. The added basis risk is a result of the cost difference 
in a voyage charter and a time charter contract. Time charter contracts are exposed to bunkers 
prices,  and  the  price  risk  is  on  the  charterers’  hand.   In  a  voyage  charter  contract   the  shipowner  
will only hedge the dollar per day rate, leaving the bunker price risk unhedged. Note, that this 
added risk from bunkers price fluctuations could be hedged by other derivatives. 
 
3.4.4 Duration  
Duration refers to the risk of using different time on a voyage than expected. As previously 
mentioned, BCI is based on the four time charter routes. These routes have standard voyage 
length stated in the Manual for Panellists made by the Baltic Exchange, seen in table 2.4. Each 
time duration of a voyage is different compared to this standard, there will be a mismatch 
between the underlying FFA market and the physical exposure. This mismatch is a source of 
basis risk. There are several factors that influence duration of a voyage. First of all vessels tend to 
operate under different speeds than the stated Baltic standard speed at 14.5 knots laden and 15 
knots ballast. Even if the speed is similar to Baltic standard, harsh weather and unforeseen 
accidents can influence duration. Secondly, duration is also affected by port congestion. Port 
congestion is basically a queue waiting for loading or discharging. Exhibit 3.2 shows port 
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congestion for port Dampier in Australia from mid-2004 to 2012. Factors influencing voyage 
duration will be discussed in section 4.2.4. 
 
Exhibit 3.2: Port congestion for Port Dampier in Australia 
 
The exhibit shows port congestion for Port Dampier in Australia for the period 6/27/2004 to 12/31/2012   
Source: Klaveness Chartering 
 
3.4.5 Unemployment 
In practice a shipowner typically does not hedge each voyage, but has a longer time horizon on 
hedging positions. An example is that a shipowner hedges his vessel with a three-year position in 
a FFA contract. Because of unemployment or lay-up, the shipowner might not have income from 
his vessel the entire period. Each period the vessel does not have an income, the shipowner 
hedges a non-existing cash flow. This difference is a source of basis risk. Lay-up refers to the 
decision of temporary cessation of trading of a vessel. In the Capesize segment lay-up is almost 
non-existent currently, as vessels remain in the market even if spot decrease below operating 
costs. Unemployment is more common, as vessels tend to lie idle and wait for orders in poor 
markets. Unemployment is a relevant basis risk, but not in the scope of this dissertation. 
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3.4.6 Timing 
Timing refers to the mismatch between paper and physical contracts. Paper contracts are settled 
at the end of each month as an arithmetic average of spot rates within the month, while physical 
contracts can be concluded any time in that period. This means that the settlement rate, arithmetic 
average over the month, will be different from the spot rate that the vessel is fixed. Depending on 
the volatility of the underlying market this mismatch can have an important effect on the 
performance of the hedge.  (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2009)  
 
This basis risk can be removed by using index-linked physical contracts, where the freight rate is 
updated daily according to the prevailing Baltic index. This way, the physical contract and the 
FFA are priced similarly. Some operators in the dry market apply this method. (Alizadeh & 
Nomikos, 2009) 
 
3.5 Optimal hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness 
To evaluate if the Baltic Capesize Index is a good proxy for actual Capesize earnings we will 
examine its hedging performance. The ultimately objective of a hedge is to minimize the risk.  A 
traditional naïve or one-to-one hedge assumes that the underlying and the derivative move closely 
together, however it fails to recognize imperfect correlation between spot index and actual 
earnings. In the following section, we will introduce two methods for calculating the optimal 
hedge ratio and its hedging effectiveness. 
 
3.5.1 Minimum variance framework 
Ederington (1979) developed a minimum variance framework that took imperfect correlations 
between the underlying and derivative into account, showing that it was possible to offset 
potential risk associated to a given spot position using future contracts. With   Ederington’s  
framework it is possible to calculate the minimum variance hedge ratio and its hedging 
effectiveness. This ratio depends on the relationship between changes in the spot- and future 
prices. The price of a future contract is equal to price of a forward contract, under an assumption 
of deterministic interest rates. The following will describe how the formula is derived.  
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St denotes the value of the hedged item, h is the hedge ratio and Ft denotes the value of the future 
contract at time t. Then the combined value of the portfolio, Pt, at time t is 
 
𝑃௧ = 𝑆௧ − ℎ𝐹௧,் ( 12 ) 
 
The change in value for this position from time t-1 to t is defined as 
 
∆𝑃௧ = ∆𝑆௧ − ℎ∆𝐹௧,் ( 13 ) 
 
where ∆𝑃௧ = 𝑃௧ − 𝑃௧ିଵ, ∆𝑆௧ = 𝑆௧ − 𝑆௧ିଵ  𝑎𝑛𝑑  ∆𝐹௧ = 𝐹௧,் − 𝐹௧ିଵ,். By converting equation 13, 
the variance of the hedged portfolio can be described as 
 
𝜎∆௉
ଶ = 𝜎∆ௌ
ଶ + ℎଶ𝜎∆ி
ଶ − 2ℎ𝜎∆ௌ,∆ி 
=𝜎∆ௌଶ + ℎଶ𝜎∆ிଶ − 2h𝜌∆ௌ,∆ி𝜎∆ௌ𝜎∆ி ( 14 ) 
 
Then by minimizing the variance by taking the first order derivative of 𝜎∆௉ଶ  with respect to h, the 
result can be expressed as 
 
డఙ∆ು
మ
డ௛
= 2ℎ𝜎∆ி
ଶ − 2𝜌∆ௌ,∆ி𝜎∆ௌ𝜎∆ி = 0  ( 15 ) 
 
The minimum variance hedge ratio can be expressed as the ratio of the covariance between spot 
and future price changes over the unconditional variance of future price changes 
 
ℎ∗ = ఙ∆ೄ,∆ಷ
ఙ∆ಷ
మ = 𝜌∆ௌ,∆ி
ఙ∆ೄ
ఙ∆ಷ
 ( 16 ) 
 
3.5.1.1 Hedge effectiveness 
Ederington (1979) showed that while traditional theory suggested that the best hedge ratio was 
based on a naïve one-to-one hedge ratio, this is not always correct. In addition, portfolio theory 
provided a measurement of hedging effectiveness. The hedge effectiveness is a measurement of 
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the portion of the variance that is eliminated by hedging. Mathematically, this can be expressed 
as  
 
𝑒 = 1 − ఙ∆ು
మ
ఙ∆ೄ
మ   ( 17 ) 
 
where hedging effectiveness is denoted as e. Inserting equation 14 into the formula, the 
effectiveness can be expressed as 
 
𝑒 = 1 − ఙ∆ೄ
మ ା௛మఙ∆ಷ
మ ିଶ௛ఙ∆ೄ,∆ಷ
ఙ∆ೄ
మ =
ఙ∆ೄ
మ ିఙ∆ೄ
మ ି௛మఙ∆ಷ
మ ାଶ௛ఙ∆ೄ,∆ಷ
ఙ∆ೄ
మ =
ି௛మఙ∆ಷ
మ ାଶ௛ఙ∆ೄ,∆ಷ
ఙ∆ೄ
మ  ( 18 ) 
 
In order to use the minimum variance hedge ratio to find the hedging effectiveness, equation 16 
has to be incorporated into the previous formula. 
 
𝑒 =
ିቆ
഑∆ೄ,∆ಷ
഑∆ಷ
మ ቇ
మ
ఙ∆ಷ
మ ାଶቆ
഑∆ೄ,∆ಷ
഑∆ಷ
మ ቇఙ∆ೄ,∆ಷ
ఙ∆ೄ
మ =
഑∆ೄ,∆ಷ
మ
഑∆ಷ
మ
ఙ∆ೄ
మ   ( 19 ) 
 
Finally, hedging effectiveness can be expressed   as   the   squared   coefficient,   ρ2, of correlation 
between changes in spot- and future prices. 
 
𝑒 =
ఙ∆ೄ,∆ಷ
మ
ఙ∆ಷ
మ ఙ∆ೄ
మ = 𝜌ଶ ( 20 ) 
 
The hedging effectiveness measures the relative reduction in portfolio risk, which results from 
the inclusion of the optimal amount of future contracts in the portfolio. Thus, the objective is to 
obtain the minimum risk position for the combined portfolio. 𝜌ଶ measure the reduction on an 
existing portfolio variance which results from the use of the minimum variance hedge ratio. If 
𝜌ଶ = 1, the hedging effectiveness is 100 percent and the hedge is optimal. If 𝜌ଶ < 1, there are 
still risk remaining and the hedge is not perfect. (Ederington, 1979) 
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3.5.2 Single linear regression 
An alternative method for finding the optimal hedge ratio is by single linear regression. This 
model will yield the same result as the Ederington framework, and a link between the two can be 
explained mathematically.  
 
Linear regression is defined as 
 
∆𝑆௧ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛽ଵ∆𝐹௧,் + 𝑢௧            ( 21 ) 
 
where   α   and   β   are   constants.   In   the   linear   regression   model,   ∆𝑆௧ is the dependent variable, 
whereas ∆𝐹௧,் is the explanatory variable. 𝑢௧ is the error term from ordinary least square 
estimation. Inserting equation 21 into equation 13 gives 
 
∆𝑃௧ = ∆𝑆௧ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛽ଵ∆𝐹௧,் + 𝑢௧ − ℎ∆𝐹௧,் = 𝛼଴ − (ℎ + 𝛽ଵ)∆𝐹௧,் + 𝑢௧. ( 22 ) 
 
Applying this to the variance for the risk minimizing portfolio 
 
𝜎∆௉
ଶ = 𝛽ଵଶ𝜎∆ி
ଶ + ℎଶ𝜎∆ி
ଶ − 2ℎ𝛽ଵ𝜎∆ி
ଶ + 𝜎௨ଶ. ( 23 ) 
 
Next, minimize the variance by deriving equation 23 with respect to h and set it equal to zero 
 
ௗఙ∆ು
మ
ௗ௛
= 2ℎ𝜎∆ி
ଶ − 2𝛽ଵ𝜎∆ி
ଶ = 0  ( 24 ) 
 
ℎ∗ = ଶఉభఙ∆ಷ
మ
ଶఙ∆ಷ
మ = 𝛽ଵ. ( 25 ) 
 
Thus, the optimal hedge ratio is equal to the slope coefficient from the regression. By replacing 
h*  with  β1, equation 18 can be expressed as 
 
𝑒 = 1 − ఉభ
మఙ∆ಷ
మ ାఉభ
మఙ∆ಷ
మ ିଶఉభ
మఙ∆ಷ
మ ାఙೠమ
ఙ∆ೄ
మ   
⇔ 𝑒 = 1 − ఙೠ
మ
ఙ∆ೄ
మ = 𝑅ଶ. ( 26 ) 
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R2 is a measure of how well the estimated regression lines fit actual observations. Hence, hedging 
effectiveness can be set equal to R2 in the linear regression model. 
 
3.5.2.1 Assumptions underlying the regression model 
The estimation technique used in classical linear regression models is based on five assumptions 
related to the errors from the regression (𝑢௧). These are 
 
1. The errors have zero mean, 𝐸(𝑢௧) = 0 
2. The variance of the errors is constant and finite over all values of xt,  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢௧) = 𝜎ଶ <
∞ 
3. The errors are linearly independent of one another, 𝐶𝑜𝑣൫𝑢௜, 𝑢௝൯ = 0 
4. There is no relationship between the error and corresponding x variety, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢௧, 𝑥௧) =
0 
5. The errors are normally distributed, 𝑢௧~𝑁(0, 𝜎ଶ) 
 
If these assumptions hold the estimators will be the best linear unbiased estimators of their true 
values. In this model, it is assumed that error term (𝑢௧) in equation 21 is normally distributed 
with a zero mean and constant variance or homoscedastic in order to conduct single or joint 
hypothesis tests about the model parameters. 𝑢௧ is also assumed to be uncorrelated, meaning that 
the covariance of the residuals of the spot returns and residuals of the futures returns is zero over 
time.  
 
Assumption one is easy to test by including a constant term, 𝑢௧ in equation 21 (Brooks, 2008). 
Due to the practical approach in  this dissertation, with simulations, testing the other assumptions 
for all regression analysis is comprehensive and thought to be beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
 
3.6 Is basic financial theory applicable in shipping? 
The Ederington framework is a well-accepted method for estimating optimal hedge ratio and 
hedging efficiency within finance. The single linear regression that can be derived from the 
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framework has been applied by for instance Kavussanos and Visvikis (2000a) when investigating 
hedging performance of different freight routes. Their results indicate that it is optimal to use low 
hedge ratios, and that the corresponding hedging efficiency was low when hedging with FFA 
contracts. This has mainly been due to the low correlation between freight rates and the FFA 
contracts, as a result of no cost-of-carry relationship between them. Such low hedge ratios may 
question whether a financial theory, which is based on hedging instrument with high correlation, 
is applicable in practice to determine optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency in shipping. 
 
Gray (1990) questioned whether an excessive degree of statistical accuracy in the calculation of 
correlations and the level of the hedge is necessary, and argues that this may be fundamentally 
misleading. The freight market is a difficult and hard-to-define market, in contrast to financial 
markets where each price is known on a penny basis on a second-to-second basis. He further 
argues that freight hedging is by definition a comparatively imprecise mechanism, and that a 
more sensible approach for estimating correlation is preferable. The correlation is not expected to 
be close to perfect, but there is still a reasonable correlation between actual earnings and freight 
derivatives that can be utilized. Even though the shipping industry and freight derivatives market 
has evolved since Gray presented his views, the fundamental of his arguments is still relevant.  
 
There exist alternative methods for measuring hedging efficiency, which is not based on the 
correlation. An example of such a method is the dollar-offset method, which may be more 
sensible   than  Ederington’s   framework   and   linear   regression.  This  method  has   a  more   practical  
approach and determines hedging efficiency based on absolute changes in the value of the 
underlying and the derivative. The method is commonly applied for measuring hedging 
efficiency in accounting. As an extension of the discussion above we will introduce the method, 
and later compare the results between the different methods. 
 
3.6.1 The dollar-offset method 
The dollar-offset method is a quantitative method that compares changes in fair value or cash 
flow of the hedged item and the derivative. It can both be applied period-by-period or 
cumulatively. If the change in the derivative exactly offsets the change in the value of the hedged 
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item, the negative of their ratio would be -1.00. The cumulative form of the dollar-offset method 
can be expressed mathematically as 
 
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟  𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = −(∑ 𝑋௜  /∑ 𝑌௜௡௜ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ )            ( 27 ) 
 
Where Xi is periodic changes in the value of the derivative and Yi is periodic changes in the value 
of   the   hedged   item.   Which   ratios   that   are   regarded   as   “highly   efficient”   is   a   matter   of  
interpretation. Swad (1995) argued that ratios between 0.80 and 1.25 should be regarded as 
efficient. Hence, all ratios outside of this range have to be regarded as inefficient. This range has 
later become an industry standard in accounting (Finnerty & Grant, 2003).  
 
An important drawback with the method is that the ratio test is very sensitive to small changes in 
the value of the hedged item or derivative. As an example, consider an inventory valued at 
$1,000,000 and the hedge is a short position in a futures contract. If the fair value of the inventory 
and the basis only change by a small amount, for instance 1% and 0.33%, these changes imply an 
inefficient ratio of 33%, even though the correlation between the variables can be close to perfect. 
Canaberro (1999) suggests that under reasonable assumptions, the 0.80-1.25 standard rejects 36% 
of all hedges when the squared correlation, R2, is 0.98 or better. However, due to the highly 
volatile freight rates observed in shipping, the problem with small changes is of less importance. 
 
Charnes, Koch & Berkman (2003) argue that a meaningful measure of hedge efficiency should 
incorporate both the correlation between the hedged item and the hedging instrument and a hedge 
ratio included in a combined portfolio. These variables are not incorporated in the dollar-offset 
method. Therefore, they argue that the dollar-offset model is not preferred for measuring hedge 
efficiency.  
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4. Data and model description 
This section will provide description of the data set used and a detailed description of the model. 
4.1 Data 
Our data series contains Capesize freight rates from 1st of January 2003 and up until 31st of 
December 2012 from the Baltic Exchange. Exhibit 4.1 presents a graphical plot of the historical 
freight rates in the Baltic Capesize Index, which best reflects the historical development in the 
Capesize segment. It shows how the spot prices were rising prior to the financial crisis and how 
the market reacted. 
 
Exhibit 4.1 Historical BCI spot prices 
Source: The Baltic exchange 
 
Descriptive data for the historical freight rates are presented in table 4.1 and 4.2. The voyage 
charter rates are presented in table 4.1 and time charter routes in table 4.2. The statistics are based 
on daily simple returns for each route.  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for voyage charter rates 
 C2 C3 C4 C5 C7 
# observations 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 
Mean 
2004-2008 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
2009-2012 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
2004-2012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Std. dev. 
2004-2008 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.019 
2009-2012 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.025 0.018 
 
2004-2012 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.025 0.019 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kurtosis 10.123 11.300 20.828 14.465 10.651 
Skewness 0.466 0.214 0.957 0.817 0.538 
Numbers are presented in absolute terms 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for time charter rates 
  C8_03 C9_03 C10_03 C11_03 TC Avg BCI 
# observations 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 3,653 
Mean 
2004-2008 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
2009-2012 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.116 -0.001 
2004-2012 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.035 0.000 
Std. dev. 
2004-2008 0.036 0.028 0.041 0.035 0.031 
2009-2012 0.063 0.031 0.059 3.062 0.048 
2004-2012 0.046 0.029 0.047 1.678 0.037 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 
Kurtosis 42.824 16.480 25.863 2730.664 16.099 
Skewness 2.885 0.932 2.279 50.656 1.375 
Numbers are presented in absolute terms 
 
The mean of all the daily simple returns are close to zero over the whole period, except for the 
route C11_03. The same can also be seen from the standard deviation, where all, except C11_03, 
have a daily standard deviation of about 2-6%. This is due to the fact that the time charter rates 
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for C11_03 have been strongly negative, with a bottom of -$13,402 on 23rd of August 201210. A 
negative dollar per day rate implies a higher voyage cost than income. According to Bjerknes & 
Herje (2013) the eastbound cargo volumes on the Fronthaul voyage is about 5-7 times greater 
than the westbound voyage. Hence, most vessels will not obtain cargo on this leg, and sometimes 
the Backhaul freight rates will be negative on a time charter basis (Ådland, 2013). Looking at the 
mean return and the standard deviation on the period 2004-2008, the calculations shows that all 
routes had a similar development in freight rates. 
 
Kurtosis11 is used to measure whether the dataset is peaked or flat relative to a normal 
distribution. If the kurtosis is high the dataset tend to have a distinctive peak near the mean, 
declining rather rapidly, and have heavy tails (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2012). The distribution of returns for all the routes in 2004-2012 seems to be leptokurtic, i.e. it 
has fatter tails than the normal distribution. This is confirmed as the kurtosis is above 10 for all 
routes.  
 
Skewness12 is a measure of the lack of symmetry for the dataset. A dataset or distribution is 
symmetric if it looks the same to the right and left of the center point. Meaning that the skewness 
for a normal distribution is zero, and any symmetric data should have skewness near zero 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012).  Looking at the dataset in table 4.1 and 
4.2, all the routes have a positive skewness to the right, i.e. the right tail is long relative to the left 
tail. This is due to the fact that the $/tonne rates will never be less than zero. On contrary, there is 
no upper limit for how high spot rates may become. Positive skewness is therefore to be 
expected. 
 
                                                 
10 As freight rates become negative, the simple return will generate either large negative or positive returns as the 
spot rates shift from negative to positive or vice-versa. The calculations will also generate increasing simple returns 
as the spot rates falls from a negative number to a larger negative number.  
11 𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ∑ (௒೔ି௒
ത)రಿ೔సభ
(ேିଵ)ఙర
− 3,  where 𝑌ത  is   the   mean,   σ   is   the   standard  
deviation and N is the number of data points. 
12 𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = ∑ (௒೔ି௒
ത)యಿ೔సభ
(ேିଵ)ఙయ
, where 𝑌ത  is  the  mean,  σ  is  the  standard  deviation  and  N  is  the  number  of  data  points. 
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4.1.1 Converting freight rates 
Historical freight rates are based on a business year. The number of business days in a year can 
vary from one year to another depending on the number of weekend days. It can also vary from 
business to business, depending on the number of company holidays. The Baltic exchange only 
reports 252 freight rates per annum. As vessels operate 365 days per year, it has been necessary 
to convert the data set into 365 days per year. For each day missing a reported rate, the rate is set 
equal to the last reported rate. For instance, Saturday and Sunday rates are set equal to the rate 
reported on Friday. Note that vessel will only be fixed on weekdays. 
  
4.2 Model description 
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate if the Baltic Capesize Index is a good proxy for 
actual earnings and why they deviate. The results may implicate if forward freight agreements are 
suitable for revenue management in practice. In order to do so, it is critical to simulate a cash 
flow that is as realistic as possible. A major part of this dissertation has therefore been devoted to 
estimate income as precisely as possible. This section will give a thorough description of the 
model and necessary assumptions.  
 
4.2.1 Routes 
As the demand for dry bulk cargo has increased, numerous new harbors capable of handling 
Capesize vessels have appeared. Implementing all possible routes and harbors in the world will 
by far exceed the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, the model includes ten major routes in the 
Capesize segment, and it is assumed that this is sufficient to simulate realistic cash flows.  
 
Our data set consists of five voyage charter routes and five time charter routes. In order to 
increase the number of routes, time charter rates have been transferred to voyage charter rates13. 
Creating such generic rates is possible, as time charter routes are non-standardized and only a 
delivery and redelivery range is given. The routes are presented in table 4.3. The table also 
                                                 
13  𝑉𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
்஼  ௥௔௧௘∗ቀವ೔ೞ೟ೌ೙೎೐  ಳೌ೗೗ೌೞ೟మర∗ೞ೛೐೐೏ ା
ವ೔ೞ೟ೌ೙೎೐  ಽೌ೏೐೙
మర∗ೞ೛೐೐೏ ቁାி௨௘௟  ௖௢௦௧ା௉௢௥௧  ௖௢௦௧
஼௔௥௚௢  ௜௡௧௔௞௘
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presents what type of path each route belongs to and the length of the ballast- and laden distance. 
All route specific data are gathered from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Weekly, except the 
route Qingdao – Tubarao – Qingdao. This route is categorized as a Pacific – Atlantic – Pacific 
route and has increased in importance the latter years, especially for very large ore carriers14.  
 
Table 4.3: Route description on 10 major Capesize routes 
Route Start - Load – Discharge Path Distance Laden (nm) Distance Ballast (nm) 
C2 Rotterdam - Tubarao – Rotterdam TAC 5025 5025 
C7 Rotterdam – Bolivar – Rotterdam TAC 4500 4500 
C8_03 Rotterdam - Baltimore – Rotterdam TAC 3665 3665 
C3 Rotterdam - Tubarao - Beilun/Baoshan FHC 10874 4974 
C5 Qingdao - Hay Point – Qingdao TPC 4104 4104 
C10_03 Beilun/Baoshan - Goa - Beilun/Baoshan TPC 4497 4668 
C10_03 Beilun/Baoshan - Dampier- Beilun/Baoshan TPC 3371 3500 
C11_03 Qingdao – Queensland – Rotterdam BHC 13633 3943 
C4 Qingdao - Richards Bay - Rotterdam BHC 7054 7341 
C3 Qingdao – Tubarao - Qingdao P-A-P 10874 10874 
Source: Clarkson Shipping Intelligence Weekly 
 
4.2.2 Voyage pattern 
When a shipowner has fulfilled the contract terms, he can freely choose where to take his vessel 
next. For instance, he might take another round voyage or choose reposition his vessel to another 
ocean. The model chooses the next route randomly on the basis of a probability for each route. 
This probability is based on historical trade flows from Thurlestone Shipping, see exhibit 2.1. 
The exhibit shows trade patterns for Trans-Pacific, Trans-Atlantic, Fronthaul and Backhaul, but it 
does not contain route specific trade flows. Therefore each route within a category has been given 
an equal weighting. For instance, in 2012, 60.8% of all trade flows was Trans-Pacific. Since there 
are included three different Trans-Pacific routes in the model, the probability for choosing one of 
the routes is 20.3%. All the other route probabilities are presented in table 4.4. Note that the 
Pacific – Atlantic – Pacific route is here considered as a Fronthaul.  
                                                 
14 Also referred to as VLOC, and is bulk carriers with dwt above 300,000 tons 
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Table 4.4: Development in probability for different routes 
Path Route 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
TAC C2 6.7% 7.8% 6.5% 6.8% 6.8% 5.7% 3.7% 4.4% 4.4% 3.7% 
TAC C7 6.7% 7.8% 6.5% 6.8% 6.8% 5.7% 3.7% 4.4% 4.4% 3.7% 
TAC C8_03 6.7% 7.8% 6.5% 6.8% 6.8% 5.7% 3.7% 4.4% 4.4% 3.7% 
FHC C3 7.4% 8.5% 5.4% 8.5% 9.6% 9.7% 11.6% 11.7% 11.3% 11.8% 
TPC C5 15.5% 15.1% 18.5% 16.1% 16.3% 18.0% 19.2% 18.9% 19.6% 20.3% 
TPC C10_03 15.5% 15.1% 18.5% 16.1% 16.3% 18.0% 19.2% 18.9% 19.6% 20.3% 
TPC C10_03 15.5% 15.1% 18.5% 16.1% 16.3% 18.0% 19.2% 18.9% 19.6% 20.3% 
BHC C11_03 9.3% 7.1% 7.0% 7.2% 5.7% 4.8% 4.1% 3.4% 2.7% 2.4% 
BHC C4 9.3% 7.1% 7.0% 7.2% 5.7% 4.8% 4.1% 3.4% 2.7% 2.4% 
P-A-P C3 7.4% 8.5% 5.4% 8.5% 9.6% 9.7% 11.6% 11.7% 11.3% 11.8% 
   100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  
 
In practice, a vessel located in the Atlantic basin can only make Trans-Atlantic round voyages or 
Fronthauls, as strategic repositioning of vessel is not incorporated15. Hence, only Trans-Atlantic 
and Fronthaul voyages are relevant to determine probabilities for the next voyage. Table 4.5 and 
4.6 present probabilities for vessels located in the Atlantic basin and Pacific basin respectively.  
 
Table 4.5: Probabilities for a vessel located in the Atlantic basin 
Position: Atlantic basin Rate 2003 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Rotterdam – Tubarao – Rotterdam C2 24.4% 23.5% 21.3% 17.8% 16.1% 
Rotterdam – Bolivar – Rotterdam C7 24.4% 23.5% 21.3% 17.8% 16.1% 
Rotterdam – Baltimore - Rotterdam C8_03 24.4% 23.5% 21.3% 17.8% 16.1% 
Rotterdam – Tubarao – Beilun C3 26.9% 29.4% 36.1% 46.7% 51.8% 
 
                                                 
15 Strategic repositioning is changing the vessels position, under the expectation of obtaining higher rates elsewhere 
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Table 4.6: Probabilities for a vessel located in the Pacific basin 
Position: Pacific basin Rate 2003 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Qingdao – Hay Point – Qingdao C5 21.4% 22.7% 24.6% 25.2% 26.2% 
Beilun – Goa - Beilun C10_03 21.4% 22.7% 24.6% 25.2% 26.2% 
Beilun – Dampier - Beilun C10_03 21.4% 22.7% 24.6% 25.2% 26.2% 
Qingdao – Queensland – Rotterdam C11_03 12.8% 10.1% 6.5% 4.5% 3% 
Qingdao – Richards Bay – Rotterdam C4 12.8% 10.1% 6.5% 4.5% 3% 
Qingdao – Tubarao – Qingdao C3 10.2% 11.9% 13.2% 15.6% 15.3% 
 
4.2.3 Vessel specifications 
The model is based on three different Capesize vessels. One is assumed to be identical to the 
Baltic standard vessel, this way basis risk due to technical specifications will be absent. The two 
other are gathered from Clarkson World Fleet Register, and is based on peer group analysis. This 
means that each vessel is based on around 30 actual Capesize vessels. When implementing data 
for a group of almost identical vessels instead of one vessel, we believe that we will avoid special 
case observations. To emphasize the importance of vessel specifications the other two vessels 
differ from the Baltic Standard vessel. The three different vessels are presented in table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7: Vessel specifications 
 Built Loading capacity Speed Laden Speed Ballast Fuel con. 
Fuel. Con. 
in port 
Baltic Standard  - 172,000 dwt 14,5 knots 15 knots 56 tonne 3.5 tonne 
Hanjin Haypoint 1990 150,302 dwt 13.53 knots 14.03 knots 43.79 tonne 1 tonne 
Cape Azalea 2012 220,000 dwt 14.66 knots 15.16 knots 63.6 tonne 3.5 tonne 
Source: Clarkson Fleet Register 
In reality, a vessel can never load 100% of its dwt capacity, as dwt is the sum of cargo, fuel, 
crew, provisions etc. All vessels are therefore assumed to have a constant loading factor of 95%. 
The different technical specifications will impact vessels profitability through fuel costs, port 
charges and income. Fuel costs are dependent on the vessels fuel consumption and operating 
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speed. Port charges vary by the vessels dwt and income is dependent on the vessels loading 
capacity.   
 
4.2.4 Voyage duration 
Voyage duration is a key variable for simulating a realistic cash flow, as it decides the number of 
voyages possible, fuel cost and when vessels are fixed on the next voyage. Variables affecting 
voyage duration in addition to distance are time spent in port, port congestion, operating speed 
and sea margin. In the following section, we will describe how the different variables are 
incorporated.  
 
4.2.4.1 Time spent in Port  
On a voyage, vessels need to both load and discharge cargo. The length of this operation varies 
between ports, as some ports are more modern and efficient than others. Different type of vessels 
will also affect time spent at port. Data used are gathered from Clarkson and are observed 
averages for Capesize vessels on the routes. The figures are presented in table 4.8. (Clarkson, 
2012) 
 
4.2.4.2 Port congestion 
As a vessel arrives at its designated port, the time the vessel spends waiting for anchorage is an 
important factor to determine the duration of a trip. Congestion in bulk load ports is an increasing 
problem as the average waiting time has increased in recent years (DNV, 2013). 
 
Data provided by Klaveness Chartering and Ådland shows that congestion differs quite heavily 
from day to day, therefore weekly averages is believed to give a better idea of actual congestion 
in a period. Gathering a complete dataset for all relevant ports proved to be difficult. On some 
ports we do not have any data, while on others the data do not cover the whole relevant period. 
On ports where there is no data, the congestion is assumed to be equal to a port nearby. Table 4.8 
highlights sources on congestion for each route. On ports where we missed data on certain 
periods, the congestion is assumed to randomly vary within a given interval based on observed 
trends. In appendix 9.1, it is highlighted how the observed trend is used for simulating missing 
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values. In addition, since congestion only has been a problem since 2006, the maximum 
congestion was reduced for the period 2003 to 2005. 
 
Table 4.8: Distance and time spent at port for different routes 
Route Laden distance 
Ballast, 
distance 
Port time, 
days 
Source 
congestion, 
Load 
Source 
congestion, 
discharge 
Sea 
margin 
Rotterdam – Tubarao – Rotterdam 5025 5025 6 Tubarao 0* 5% 
Rotterdam – Bolivar – Rotterdam 4500 4500 9.9 Tubarao 0* 5% 
Rotterdam – Baltimore - Rotterdam 3665 3665 8.5 Tubarao 0* 5% 
Rotterdam – Tubarao – Beilun 10874 4974 9.5 Tubarao Beilun 5% 
Qingdao – Hay Point – Qingdao 4104 4104 10.5 Hay Point Qingdao 5% 
Beilun – Goa – Beilun 4497 4668 11.5 Goa Beilun 5% 
Beilun – Dampier – Beilun 3371 3500 7.5 Dampier Beilun 5% 
Qingdao – Queensland – Rotterdam 13633 3943 9.4 Hay Point 0* 5% 
Qingdao – Richards Bay – Rotterdam 7054 7341 8.9 Richards Bay 0* 5% 
Qingdao – Tubarao – Qingdao 10874 10874 9.5 Tubarao Qingdao 5% 
* Congestion has not been a problem in Rotterdam, and it is assumed to be equal to zero 
 
4.2.4.3 Operating speed 
Operating speed influences the time spent at sea, the fuel consumption and thus the fuel cost. 
Each vessel has a designed operating speed, but this may not be the speed they operate at. There 
have been several studies on how shipowners can maximize their cash flow by operating at an 
optimal speed. Ådland (2013) suggest that Capesize vessels constantly slow steam, regardless of 
the theory on optimal speed choice. In the following, this level of operating speed is assumed to 
be 11.5 knots, and will be referred to as the charterparty speed. The model incorporates operating 
speed based on Baltic standard speed, optimal speed and charterparty speed, to emphasize how 
the cash flows and hedging efficiency are affected. Below we give a thorough description of the 
theory around optimal speed choice. 
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4.2.4.3.1 Optimal speed 
Over the years there has been different studies looking at how to find the optimal operating 
speed. Strandenes (1981) looked at potential cost cutting from slow steaming for large tankers 
compared to smaller sizes and bulk carriers. Next, Ronen (1982) formulated a theoretical 
framework for speed optimization in subject to different operational modes. Assman (2012) 
tested the theoretical linear relationship between the log-speed and the logarithmic of the 
freight/fuel price ratio for the dry bulk and VLCC16 market. These studies show that the 
relationship between vessel speed (V) and the daily fuel consumption (F) can be expressed as  
 
F = α ∗ 𝑉ఉ       In the range Vmin < V < Vmax ( 28 ) 
 
Where  α  and  β  are  vessel-specific constants that vary depending on whether a vessel is sailing 
laden or ballast. The speed (V) is set to vary within a minimum and maximum range. Vessels 
have to maintain a minimum speed for safe steering and are not able to travel at speeds above 
designed maximum. Maximum operating speed varies between the three vessels, but the 
minimum speed is assumed to be constant at 6 knots. For simplicity, the fact that charter-parties 
may lay restriction on the operating speed has been ignored. 
 
As the relationship between speed and fuel consumption is in place, the next task a shipowner has 
to overcome is how to optimize his income, supposing that the vessel is chartered on a voyage 
charter. For the purpose of illustration we ignore the time spent in port and add this to the model 
later on.  As port costs do not depend on the chosen vessel speed we can simplify the daily spot 
earnings  of  the  vessel  (π)  as 
 
𝜋 = ோ∗ௐವ
మర∗ೇ
− 𝑃௕ ∗ 𝐹 =
ோ∗ௐ
ವ
మర∗ೇ
− 𝑃௕ ∗ 𝛼 ∗ 𝑉ఉ ( 29 ) 
 
where R is the spot freight rate obtained on a voyage charter party ($/tonne), W is the cargo size 
(in tonnes), Pb is the price of bunkers ($/tonne) and the total trip distance is D (nautical miles).  
                                                 
16 Very Large Crude Carrier 
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By deriving the profit with respect to speed and set the equation equal to zero we get the optimal 
formula  
ௗగ
ௗ௏
= ଶସ∗ோ∗ௐ
஽
−𝛽 ∗ 𝑃௕ ∗ 𝛼 ∗ 𝑉ఉିଵ = 0 ( 30 ) 
 
𝑉∗ = ( ଶସ∗ோ∗ௐ
஽∗ఉ∗௉್∗ఈ
)
భ
ഁషభ ( 31 ) 
 
Equation 31 tells us that the optimal speed is a non-linear function of the ratio between spot 
freight rate and fuel price, given that the distance, D, is constant. In other words, the optimal 
speed is given by the ratio between freight rates and bunker prices. The equation is consistent 
with theory about equilibrium in the shipping sector presented earlier. When rates are low, one 
way to increase spot rates is by reducing the supply of vessels. When shipowners adjusts the 
operating speed, this will have an impact on total supply and the prices for their services.  
 
Exhibit 4.2: Optimal laden speed 
The exhibit shows the theoretical optimal speed for the Baltic standard Capesize vessel on the C2 route (Rotterdam – 
Tubarao – Rotterdam) from 1/1/2003 to 12/31/2012 
 
Exhibit 4.2 shows that prior to mid-2011 the ratio between bunker prices and freight rates was 
such that there was not optimal to slow steam. It is important to have in mind that this is a static 
model, not adjusted for changes in the spot prices as days go by. Once the optimal speed has been 
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found, the vessel is set to operate at that level throughout the leg, regardless on the development 
in bunker prices or spot rates. The speed is updated twice for each voyage, one for the ballast leg 
and one for the laden leg. 
 
4.2.4.4 Sea Margin 
Time spent at sea is not only determined by the operating speed, but is also affected by weather 
and other delays. To account for such delays it is added a 5 percent sea margin. The sea margin 
influences the operating speed, and is set to reduce the operating speed by 5%. (Ådland & 
Strandenes, 2004) 
 
4.2.5 Voyage cost 
Voyage costs mainly consist of fuel costs, port charges, pilotage and canal dues. Canal dues are 
not relevant, as no route involves canal transit. Pilotage constitutes a very small part of total 
voyage costs, and has therefore been ignored. In the following section, we will describe how fuel 
cost and port charges are implemented. 
 
4.2.5.1 Fuel cost 
Voyage costs are mainly determined by fuel costs, which depend on bunker prices and fuel 
consumption. Equation 32 shows the calculation 
 
Fuel  cost = Duration ∗ Fuel  consumption ∗ Bunker  price  ( 32 ) 
 
Fuel consumption is a function of operating speed, seen in equation 28. Vessel specification, 
from Clarksons fleet register, only states fuel consumption when the vessel is operating at the 
design speed. By converting equation 28, all other combinations of speed and fuel consumption 
are given by the relationship (Ådland, 2013) 
 
୊
୊ౚ
= ቀ ୚
୚ౚ
ቁ
β
     ( 33 ) 
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where Fd and Vd presents the corresponding fuel consumption and the design speed respectively. 
This means that by rearranging equation 28, the parameter α  can  be  written  as 
 
α = ୊ౚ
୚ౚ
β     ( 34 ) 
It is assumed that the standard value for the power function parameter β is set to 2.5535 for laden 
and 2.6161 for ballast, presented in exhibit 4.1 (Ådland, 2013). Based on the equation above, 
table 4.9 shows how the α-parameter varies for the different vessels. 
 
Table 4.9: α parameter for different vessels 
Vessel Laden Ballast 
Baltic Standard 0.0606 0.0469 
Hanjin Haypoint 0.0566 0.0437 
Cape Azalea 0.0669 0.0518 
 
Vessels also consume fuel in port. These rates are dependent on ship specifications and are set to 
1 tonne/day for the 1990 vessel, Hanjin Haypoint, and 3.5 tonnes/day for the other two. 
(Clarkson, 2012) 
 
In the model there are only implemented two possible bunker prices, as there are observed only 
small differences in bunker prices between ports. Vessels with an initial location in the Atlantic 
basin are assumed to bunker in Rotterdam17. Vessels located in the Pacific basin are assumed to 
bunker in Singapore18. Regardless of route or duration of the voyage, all bunker costs are 
determined by its initial location and start date.  
                                                 
17 The bunker price is based on BUNKRD380, a price index for 380 centistoke fuel in Rotterdam 
18 The bunker price is based on BUNKSI380, a price index for 380 centistoke fuel in Singapore. 
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4.2.5.2 Port charges 
Port charges are based on loading and discharging costs for a 172,720 dwt vessel in 2009 from 
AXS Marine. It is assumed to be a linear relationship between port charges and deadweight 
tonnage, and that 2009 figures are representative for the entire period. Consequently, port charges 
are given in $/tonne and vary based on the vessel size. 
 
4.2.6 Summary of the calculations used in the model 
In table 4.10, we present the different symbols and calculations made use of in the model. The 
presentation is intended to give the reader a better understanding of the results presented. 
 
Table 4.10: Formula used in different calculations 
Denomination  Calculations 
𝑫 Distance  Days at sea 
𝒘 Weather  𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 = 𝐷/[24 ∗ 𝑉 ∗ (1 − 𝑤)] 
𝑽 Operating Speed   
𝑭𝑪 Fuel cost  Fuel cost 
𝑪𝒐𝒏 Fuel consumption  𝐹𝐶ௌ௘௔ = 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑃௕  
𝑷𝒃 Bunker price  𝐹𝐶௉௢௥௧ = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐶) ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑃௕  
𝑹 Rate, $/tonne   
W Loading capacity  Voyage cash flow 
𝑷𝑪 Port Charge  𝐶𝐹 = 𝑅 ∗𝑊 − (𝐹𝐶஻௔௟௟௔௦௧ + 𝐹𝐶௅௔ௗ௘௡) − 𝑃𝐶 
𝑪 Port Congestion   
TP Time at port  Daily cash flow 
   𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦  𝐶𝐹 = 𝐶𝐹/(𝐷஻ + 𝐷௅ + 𝑇𝑃 + 𝐶) 
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4.2.7 Voyage example  
To emphasize how the different variables affect voyages, we will exemplify one specific voyage 
and  a  vessel’s   trade  pattern  over   a   year.  The  example   is  based  on  a  Baltic   standard  vessel   that  
operates with optimal speed in an environment with port congestion. Exhibit 4.3 illustrates an 
example of a Trans-Pacific round voyage between Beilun, China and Goa, India fixed 1/1/2012. 
The figures made use of in exhibit 4.3 can be found in table 4.11. 
 
Exhibit 4.3: Example of a Trans-Pacific round voyage 
The exhibit shows an example of a Trans-Pacific round voyage between Goa, India and Baoshan, China in 2012 
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Table 4.11: Calculations based on exhibit 4.3 
Input Calculations 
Freight rate 13.672 
$/tonne 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑, 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 =
24ℎ ∗ $13.672 ∗ 163,400
(4668 + 4497) ∗ 𝛽 ∗ 691.5 ∗ 𝛼
ଵ
ఉିଵ
= 13.72 
Loading capacity 163,400 
tonne 
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 =
4668
[24 ∗ 13.88 ∗ (1 − 5%)]
= 15  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
Port charge, Goa 0.38 $/tonne 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 ∗ 13.72ఉ = 44.38  𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒/𝑑𝑎𝑦 
Port charge, Baoshan 0.607 $/tonne 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 = 15 ∗ 44.38 ∗ 691.5 = $  457,840 
Bunker price 691.5 $/tonne  
Fuel con. in port 3.5 tonne/day 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒, 𝐺𝑜𝑎 = 0.38 ∗ 163,400 = $  61,275 
Ballast distance 4668 nm 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝐺𝑜𝑎 = (9 + 8) ∗ 3.5 ∗ 691.5 = $  41,144 
Laden distance 4497 nm  
Sea margin 5% 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑, 𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑛 =
24ℎ ∗ $8.56 ∗ 163,400
(4668 + 4497) ∗ 𝛽 ∗ 734.5 ∗ 𝛼
ଵ
ఉିଵ
= 9.34  𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑡 
Input affecting speed laden 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠  𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑛 = 4497
[24 ∗ 9.34 ∗ (1 − 5%)]
= 21  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
Freight rate 8.555 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑛 = 𝛼 ∗ 9.34ఉ = 18.24  𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒/𝑑𝑎𝑦 
Bunker price 734.5 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑛 = 21 ∗ 18.24 ∗ 691.5 = $  266,186 
   
  𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒, 𝐵𝑎𝑜𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑛 = 0.607 ∗ 163,400 = $  99,118 
  𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝐵𝑎𝑜𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑛 = 2 ∗ 3.5 ∗ 691.5 = $  4,840 
   
  𝑉𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 13.915 ∗ 163,400 = $  2,273,711 
  𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 457,840 + 41,144 + 266,186 + 4,840 = 770,011 
  𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 = 99,118 + 61,275 = 160,393 
   
  𝑉𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 2,273,711 − 770,011 − 160,393 = 1,303,647 
 
 
The shipowner earned $ 1,303,647 in total on the voyage between Beilun/Baoshan and Goa, 
calculated in table 4.11. After the first voyage the vessel is fixed on a Backhaul, transporting coal 
from Richards Bay, South Africa to Rotterdam, the Netherlands. In Rotterdam the vessel is fixed 
on another coal voyage, this time from Bolivar, Colombia back to Rotterdam. Then the vessel 
 
 
 69 
moves back to the Pacific, by transporting iron ore from Tubarao, Brazil to Qingdao, China. 
Before the end of 2012 the vessel made two Trans-Pacific voyages between Australia and China. 
The vessel completed 6 voyages in 2012, and the pattern is shown in exhibit 4.4. 
 
Exhibit 4.4: Example of a vessels trading pattern over a year 
The exhibit shows a simulated trading pattern for a Baltic standard Capesize vessel in 2012. The vessel manage to 
complete 6 voyages the current year 
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Table 4.12: Information regarding exhibit 4.4 
The table shows duration and distance for each leg the vessel in exhibit 4.4 completed in 2012 
 
Table 4.13: Cash flow calculations to exhibit 4.4 
Path Rate Bunker Price Fuel cost Port Charge Income 
Beilun – Goa – Baoshan $ 13.67 $ 691 $ 770,011 $ 160,393 $ 1,303,647 
Qingdao – Richards Bay – Rotterdam $ 8.77 $ 742 $ 614,840 $ 232,601 $ 586,067 
Rotterdam – Bolivar – Rotterdam $ 8.53 $ 579 $ 586,778 $ 273,848 $ 533,503 
Rotterdam – Tubarao – Beilun $ 17.91 $ 588 $ 1,149,644 $ 182,675 $ 1,594,829 
Beilun – Dampier – Baoshan $ 6.72 $ 646 $ 511,401 $ 171,173 $ 415,042 
Qingdao – Hay Point - Qingdao $ 9.71 $ 599 $ 637,640 $ 168,703 $ 780,271 
The table shows fuel costs, port charge and income for the voyages made in exhibit 4.4 
 
Table 4.12 and 4.13 consist of specifications on the different voyages. There is earlier shown how 
the optimal speed varies in 2012, exhibit 4.2, and the effect operating speed and fuel consumption 
has is exemplified in table 4.13. Consider the Backhaul voyage from Qingdao to Rotterdam, a 
voyage that took 98 days including port congestion. Because of a high bunker price and a low 
freight rate, the optimal was to slow steam at a speed of 8.72 knots. Such a low speed yields low 
fuel consumption, and despite a long duration it only had fuel cost of $ 614,840. The fuel cost for 
Nr Date Path Type 
Distance 
(miles) 
Days 
at sea 
Congestion 
& Port time 
Waiting 
days 
1 1/1/2012 Beilun – Goa Ballast 4,668 15 17 - 
2 2/2/2012 Goa – Baoshan Laden 4,497 21 2 1 
3 2/27/2012 Qingdao – Richards Bay Ballast 7,341 43 8 - 
4 4/18/2012 Richards Bay – Rotterdam Laden 7,054 44 4 0 
5 6/4/2012 Rotterdam – Bolivar Ballast 4,500 17 3 - 
6 6/25/2012 Bolivar – Rotterdam Laden 4,500 18 4 0 
7 7/16/2012 Rotterdam – Tubarao Ballast 5,025 17 5 - 
8 8/8/2012 Tubarao – Beilun Laden 10,874 41 2 0 
9 9/20/2012 Beilun – Dampier Ballast 3,500 14 9 - 
10 10/13/2012 Dampier – Baoshan Laden 3,371 13 7 2 
11 11/5/2012 Qingdao – Hay Point Ballast 4,104 14 10 - 
12 11/29/2012 Hay Point – Qingdao Laden 4,104 16 5 0 
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the first voyage is over $150,000 higher, despite lower bunker price and duration of only 55 days. 
This as the ratio between freight rates and bunker prices implied a much higher operating speed, 
yielding higher fuel consumption. 
 
4.2.8 Other factors 
Cash flows in the model are converted into daily averages per vessel. These estimates are used to 
calculate the average difference between daily earnings and BCI, hedge ratio and hedge 
efficiency. For each simulation the vessel will operate one year ahead of the relevant period, else 
daily income would be constant until the first vessel finishes the first voyage.  
 
Daily differences between actual earnings and BCI tend to vary between being positive and 
negative. Hence, calculating the arithmetic average will yield deceptive results, as positive values 
would be cancelled by negative values. Instead, it is preferable to use root mean square19, RMS, 
as a measure of average return. On average RMS is equal or slightly larger than arithmetic 
averages.  
 
Hedge ratios and hedge efficiencies are based on beta and R2 in linear regression and the dollar-
offset method, discussed in section 3.5 and 3.6. The linear regression is between daily changes in 
actual earnings and BCI, respectively ∆S and ∆F. However correlation between daily changes in 
actual earnings and BCI proves to be low, exhibit 4.14. The low correlation can be explained by 
the smoothness in changes in actual earnings. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Root mean square, or quadratic mean, is a statistical measure of the magnitude of a varying quantity. 
Mathematically it can be expressed as 𝑥ோெௌ = ට
ଵ
௡
∗ (𝑥ଵ
ଶ + 𝑥ଶ
ଶ + 𝑥௡ଶ) 
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Exhibit 4.5: Daily earnings for different fleet sizes 
 
The exhibit shows daily earnings in 2010 to 2012 for two different fleet sizes 
 
Exhibit 4.5 shows daily earnings for a fleet of one and 50 vessels. Consider the fleet of 50 
vessels. Each time the shipowner’s daily income changes, one or more of his vessel has been 
fixed. Since vessels are fixed around 4-8 times per year, it is seldom more than one or two vessels 
that are fixed each time the daily cash flow changes.  Changes in actual earnings will therefore be 
more  “smooth”  compared BCI. To increase correlation the interval has been increased to monthly 
averages of daily actual earnings and monthly averages of daily BCI. By reducing to monthly 
observations, the smoothness effect is thought to become less important. Table 4.14 shows how 
the correlation increases by reducing the number of observations.  
 
The dollar-offset method is based on cumulative changes in actual earnings and BCI. The 
smoothness effect will also infer absolute changes, and it is therefore looked at monthly absolute 
returns. 
 
Table 4.14: Correlation for daily and monthly averages between actual earnings and BCI 
# Vessels 1 5 10 15 25 50 
Daily Correlation 2004-2008 2.5% 6.2% 7.3% 8.0% 9.5% 11.0% 
2009-2012 2.2% 4.9% 6.6% 7.7% 9.5% 11.7% 
Monthly 
Correlation  
2004-2008 30.2% 48.6% 53.6% 55.8% 57.5% 59.0% 
2009-2012 20.0% 37.0% 40.8% 42.8% 44.1% 44.9% 
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Deciding the number of simulations is a tradeoff between accuracy and efficiency. The results are 
based on 500 simulations as the standard error20 is below 0.3% for all the results. At this point, 
the standard error has converged and a significant increase in number of simulations is necessary 
to further reduce the standard error. A standard error of 0.3% is acceptable for the purpose of this 
dissertation and the simulations are still reasonably efficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Standard error is the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of a statistic, ఙ
√௡
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5. Findings 
In the following section we will present our findings. To see if BCI is a good proxy for actual 
Capesize earnings, we will examine each basis risk factor one-by-one before presenting a realistic 
simulation of actual earnings. Doing so, we highlight the influence each basis risk has on actual 
earnings.  
Before examining each basis risk, we will elaborate on some general observations not affected by 
basis risks. We will also examine if the hedging horizon and operating solely in one basin has any 
effect on the similarity between actual earnings and BCI. This section will only provide the most 
important findings, however all results can be found in appendix B. 
The results are divided into two different time periods. The first period will be prior to and 
including the financial crisis, 2004-2008, and the second period is for 2009-2012. Doing so, the 
different simulations will highlight how basis risk factors have changed as the Capesize spot rates 
have gone from historical high levels and down to historical low levels.  
 
5.1 General observations 
To emphasize observations not affected by different basis risks, results shown in this section has 
a minimum of basis risk. The only basis risk left is the fact that the vessel hedges regionally 
obtained freight rates with an instrument that is based on a global average and settlement 
mismatch between paper and physical contracts. Hence, the basis risks geography and timing. 
The presented results are therefore based on a Baltic standard vessel operating at Baltic standard 
speed, in an environment without port congestion and no sea margin. The Baltic standard speed is 
as previously mentioned 14.5 knots laden and 15.0 knots ballast. 
 
5.1.1 Difference between actual earnings and BCI 
In the following, there will be a brief discussion of the differences between changes in daily 
actual earnings and BCI. The difference between actual earnings and BCI in the two periods is 
presented in table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Difference between actual earnings and BCI 
# vessels 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 25 50 100 
2004 - 2008 91.3% 81.5% 77.7% 76.1% 75.2% 70.9% 69.7% 68.6% 67.6% 67.5% 
2009 - 2012 93.5% 74.3% 66.2% 61.3% 58.4% 51.6% 49.4% 47.5% 46.1% 46.0% 
The table shows the difference between changes in daily actual earnings and BCI for different fleet sizes for the 
periods 2004 – 2008 and 2009 - 2012 
 
In 2004 – 2008 the average daily difference between actual earnings and BCI stabilizes around 
67.5%, and in 2009 – 2012 around 46.0%.  An  important   reason  for   this  difference   is   the  “lag”  
between actual earnings and  BCI.  The  “lag”  refers  to  the  time  before  changed  market  conditions, 
in BCI, are reflected in actual earnings. For instance, short voyages might be fixed every 30 days, 
and longer voyages around every 100 days. Consequently, daily changes in BCI will not 
immediately be reflected in actual earnings. Changes will first be reflected when a majority of the 
fleet are fixed on new rates. Exhibit 5.1 and 5.2 show a graphical plot of an example of actual 
earnings and BCI for the periods, 2004 – 2008 and 2009 - 2012. The exhibits show that it takes 
time before a top or bottom in BCI is reflected in the   fleet’s   earnings. Large fluctuations in 
freight rates imply a larger difference between actual earnings and BCI. It is by no surprise that 
2008, the year when the market peaked and plummet, is the year when the annual differences was 
at its largest. 
 
Exhibit 5.1: Actual earnings in 2003 - 2008 compared to BCI   
  
Daily earnings for a fleet of 50 vessels compared the Baltic Capesize Index for the period 2003-2008. The exhibit 
exemplifies  the  “lag”  effect  in a  fleet’s  earnings. 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
01/01/2004 19/07/2004 04/02/2005 23/08/2005 11/03/2006 27/09/2006 15/04/2007 01/11/2007 19/05/2008 05/12/2008
$/day 
Time Physical income BCI
 
 
 76 
Exhibit 5.2: Physical income in 2009 – 2012 compared to BCI   
  
Daily earnings for a fleet of 50 vessels compared to the Baltic Capesize Index for the period 2009-2012. The exhibit 
exemplifies  the  “lag”  effect  in   fleet’s  earnings. 
 
The  “lag”  effect  also explains the difference in daily RMS between actual earnings and BCI for 
the two periods. After the financial crisis the freight rates has been low, with less fluctuations in 
absolute terms. Therefore, it can be assumed that the difference in daily earnings and BCI should 
be even less than what is evident in table 5.1. Though, it is important to notice that the daily 
differences are given in percentage and not in absolute numbers. When freight rates are low, 
small absolute deviations will yield large percentage deviations. 
 
A second observation is that the difference between actual earnings and BCI converges fairly 
quickly as the fleet increases, see table 5.1. The results imply that there are only slight differences 
in RMS for a fleet consisting of 10 or more vessels. In practice this means that a shipowner will 
not get an average daily income that is much closer to BCI even if he increases his fleet from 10 
to 1000 vessels.  
 
As mentioned above, the results in table 5.1 are affected by basis risk from geography and timing. 
One might expect that these risk factors would diminish if the fleet of vessels were fixed every 
day on each of the major routes21. At that point, the fleet contains just enough vessels to reduce 
these basis risks. Though, daily difference between actual earnings and BCI are almost stabilized 
for a fleet of 10 vessels, which are not large enough to remove the effect of timing and 
                                                 
21 Major routes is here referred to Trans- Atlantic, Trans- Pacific, Backhaul and Fronthaul 
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geography. This convergence in daily income is most likely due to the fact that the income is, as 
explained under section 4.2, based on averages of daily income per vessel, called simple moving 
average. Consider the example where a shipowner has a fleet of 50 vessels, and his daily income 
is an average of all these vessels. By increasing the fleet by one vessel, it will only cause a 
negligible difference in his daily average income. For increasing fleet sizes, the marginal impact 
of an extra vessel diminishes.  
 
5.1.2 Optimal hedge ratio and hedge efficiency 
A general observation is that the optimal hedge ratio and hedge efficiency are relatively low, 
regardless of different basis risks. For instance, even with only geography and timing present in 
2004-2008, the hedge ratio and hedging efficiency is not higher than 54.2% and 38.9%, 
respectively.  
 
Table 5.2: Optimal hedge ratio and hedge efficiency 
Number of vessels 1 2 3 5 10 15 25 50 
Optimal Hedge ratio 58.0% 56.3% 55.2% 55.3% 54.8% 54.9% 54.5% 54.2% 
Hedge efficiency 11.2% 18.9% 22.8% 28.3% 34.4% 36.0% 37.7% 38.9% 
Optimal hedge ratio and hedge efficiency for different fleet sizes. The results are presented for the period 2004-2008 
and are based on monthly data. 
The optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency is initially derived from correlation between 
daily, weekly or monthly changes in actual earnings and BCI. Equation 1622 and 1823 emphasize 
how dependent optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency are of correlation. Because of the low 
correlation, even when using monthly data24, the optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency is 
expected to be low. This is evident in table 5.2, and as noted in section 5.1.1, these figures will 
not increase despite an increased fleet size. 
                                                 
22 Representation of equation 16: ℎ∗ = ఙ∆ೄ,∆ಷ
ఙ∆ಷ
మ = 𝜌∆ௌ,∆ி
ఙ∆ೄ
ఙ∆ಷ
 
23 Representation of equation 20: 𝑒 = ఙ∆ೄ,∆ಷ
మ
ఙ∆ಷ
మ ఙ∆ೄ
మ = 𝜌ଶ 
24 See table 4.14 
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5.1.3 Unstable results in 2009 – 2012 
Optimal hedge ratio and hedge efficiency differ heavily between the two periods, as they proved 
to be extremely unstable for smaller fleet sizes in 2009 – 2012. Exhibit 5.3 shows that the optimal 
hedge ratio and hedging efficiency stabilizes at fleet of around 50 vessels. From equation 16 we 
see that the unstable hedge ratio is a result of high standard deviations in actual earnings and low 
correlation between actual earnings and BCI. The hedging efficiency is close to zero as there is a 
low correlation between actual earnings and BCI.  
 
Exhibit 5.3: Optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency with Baltic standard speed 
 
The exhibit shows optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency for fleets up to 100 vessels in the period 2009-2012 
 
By changing the operating speed from the Baltic standard speed to optimal speed, both the 
optimal hedge ratio and the hedging efficiency are stabilized for a fleet of 10 vessels, presented in 
exhibit 5.4. This implies that results presented in exhibit 5.4 are caused by the operating speed. 
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Exhibit 5.4: Optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency with optimal speed 
 
Optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency when operating at optimal speed in the period 2009-2012 
 
After analyzing earnings on each route, it became evident that three routes is the source for the 
instability. These routes were two Backhaul routes, Qingdao – Queensland – Rotterdam and 
Qingdao – Richards Bay – Rotterdam, and a Trans-Atlantic route, Rotterdam – Tubarao – 
Rotterdam. What separate these routes from the others is that they will yield negative income for 
some periods in 2011 and 2012, when operating at Baltic standard speed. Table 5.3 presents a 
snapshot of the changes in income that a vessel can obtain from voyage-to-voyage. The vessel 
receives a positive income on a Trans-Pacific voyage, and as the spot rate declines, income turns 
negative on the following Backhaul voyage. 
 
Table 5.3: Snapshot of negative voyage income 
Path Date Rate Port Charge Fuel cost Income 
Qingdao – Tubarao - Qingdao 5/31/2012 18.457 157,656 2,232,615 625,602  
Qingdao – Queensland - Rotterdam 8/18/2012 8.028 284,895  1,934,738  (907,826) 
The table shows a snapshot of two possible cash flows. It shows how operating at maximum speed in bad market 
conditions may result in negative income 
The negative income is a result of operating at maximum speed, at a time with low freight rates 
and high bunker prices. Negative income has a large effect when calculating the monthly changes 
of average daily income.  When the average daily income over a month turns negative, it will 
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yield large differences between each month. For instance, if actual earnings falls from                  
-$2000/day at time zero (P0) to -$7000/day at time 1 (P1), the simple return formula25 will 
generate a positive return of 250%. On the contrary, if income at time 1 increases to $3000/day 
the simple return will generate a negative return of 250%. This example shows that simple return 
is not well suited for handling negative income rates. Nor is it possible to use logarithmic returns, 
as they are not defined for negative figures.  
 
It is important to note that the unstable result is not realistic in practice. The shipowner will not 
fix vessels on rates where he expects to lose hundreds of thousands of dollars, even before 
operating costs, capital costs etc. are taken into account. The results can be seen as a consequence 
of a random choice of routes based on probabilities, and the instability can therefore be ignored.  
 
5.2 Basis risk; Geography and timing 
In the following section we will study the basis risk factors geography and timing. The model is 
not constructed to remove these basis risks and they can therefore not be separated. The 
simulations are based on a Baltic standard vessel operating at the Baltic standard speed in an 
environment without port congestion and sea margin (The Baltic Exchange, 2012). 
 
Alizadeh and Nomikos (2009) illustrated the magnitude of the basis risk timing by studying 
percentage difference between FFA settlement rates and freight rates during the settlement month 
in the period January 2003 to April 2007. Their result showed that FFA contracts, based on the 
four time charter average, had an average difference in terms of RMS of 8.76%. This difference 
is small compared to the daily differences, which are observed between actual earnings and BCI, 
seen in table 5.1. This implies that most of the difference can be explained by the basis risk 
geography  and  the  “lag”  effect.  Note,   that   these  results  are  based  on  a  different  approach  and  a  
different time frame than this dissertation. Still, they give an idea of the magnitude of the basis 
risk timing. 
 
                                                 
25 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =    ௉భ
௉బ
− 1, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑃଴  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑃ଵ  𝑖𝑠  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑎𝑛  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑎𝑡  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  1  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 
 
 
 81 
Exhibit 5.5 shows the hedging efficiency for the period 2004-2008, when only geography and 
timing are present. The result shows that the efficiency is 38.9% for a fleet of 50 vessels. 
  
Exhibit 5.5: Hedging efficiency with limited basis risk 
 
Hedging efficiency in the period 2004 - 2008 when only basis risk from geography and timing is present 
 
The reason for the low efficiency can be related to the discussion in section 5.1.2, the importance 
of correlation between changes in income and BCI. In theory, a shipowner can have a fleet of 
vessels that are exactly equal to the Baltic standard vessel, operating at 14.5 knots laden and 15 
knots ballast and avoid port congestion. Even so, the correlation between actual earnings and BCI 
proves to be 62.4% for 50 vessels in 2004 – 2008. The difference from 100% correlation can be 
explained by the earlier discussed lag effect in addition to the basis risk from geography and 
timing.  
 
In section 3.4.2 we discussed the possibility of hedging with route specific $/tonne rates, as this 
should be more efficient than contracts based on the four time charter average. Due to poor 
liquidity in these FFA contracts, such a strategy is difficult to implement (The Baltic Exchange, 
2012). These results imply that even with a theoretical approach, there is a clear difference 
between actual earnings and BCI.  
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5.3 Basis risk; Duration 
The following section will emphasize how actual earnings are affected by the basis risk duration. 
Duration refers to the risk of using more or less time on a voyage than expected, mainly due to 
changes in operating speed and port congestion. 
 
5.3.1 Operating Speed 
The following simulation is based on the Baltic standard vessel operating with three different 
speed levels, Baltic standard speed, charterparty speed and optimal speed. Baltic standard speed 
is given in the Manual for Panellists and is 14.5 knots laden and 15.0 knots ballast (The Baltic 
Exchange, 2012). Charterparty speed is 11.5 knots laden and 12.0 knots ballast and optimal speed 
is found theoretically using equation 30 presented in section 4.2.4.3.1. A more thorough 
discussion can be found in section 4.2. Note that results found using Baltic standard speed are the 
same as the one presented in section 5.2. By comparing results when the speed differs, the added 
basis risk from operating speed will be emphasized.  
 
Exhibit 5.6: Influence on actual earnings from operating speed 
 
Development in daily differences between actual earnings and BCI, and hedging efficiency depending on the fleet 
size and operating speed in the period 2004 - 2008 
 
The definition of basis risk states that the higher difference between the spot price and the 
hedging instrument, the higher basis risk. It is therefore expected that the more operating speed 
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differ from the Baltic standard speed, the higher basis risk. The charterparty speed has both a 
larger difference between daily earnings and BCI and a lower hedging efficiency. In other words, 
the results are consistent with the definition of basis risk, as there is a clear difference between 
the charterparty speed and Baltic standard speed. 
 
There are only a small difference between optimal speed and the Baltic standard speed in 2004-
2008. This is expected as the ratio between freight rates and bunker prices implied an operating 
speed equal to the Baltic standard speed until mid-2008. The slight differences are due to reduced 
operating speed in 2008 as a result of the sharp drop in spot freight rates.  
 
The differences in hedging efficiency can once again be explained by correlation. The four time 
charter routes underlying the BCI assume that vessels operate at Baltic standard speed. If the 
speed is different from the Baltic standard, the correlation between earnings and BCI will be 
reduced and the difference increased. Lower correlation will yield lower optimal hedge ratios and 
lower hedge efficiency.  
 
5.3.2 Port congestion 
In addition to operating speed, port congestion is another factor that affects the basis risk 
duration. As discussed in section 5.1.3, simulation using Baltic standard speed generates 
unreliable results for the period 2009 – 2012. We therefore believe that the best way to emphasize 
the basis risk coming from port congestion is by comparing simulations using optimal speed. 
Operating at optimal speed in the period 2004-2008 will also result in speed that is close to Baltic 
standard speed. The following results will compare a Baltic standard vessel operating at optimal 
speed in an environment with and without port congestion.  
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Exhibit 5.7: Port congestions influence on hedging performance 
 
Hedging efficiency in 2004 – 2008 and 2009 – 2012 for different fleet sizes in an environment with and without port 
congestion 
 
Exhibit 5.7 shows hedging efficiency for both periods, 2004-2008 and 2009-2012. The exhibit 
shows that hedging efficiency is reduced when implementing port congestion in both periods. 
This  is  as  expected  since  longer  voyage  duration  will  increase  the  “lag”  effect  in  actual earnings 
compared to BCI. Further, this increase will lead to reduced correlation between daily earnings 
and BCI, as the expected voyage duration given by the Baltic exchange does not account for port 
congestion. 
 
The results imply that the basis risk due to port congestion reduces hedging efficiency by 
approximately the same amount for both periods. In both periods port congestion stands for a 
reduction in hedging efficiency of around 2-3 percentage points. Previous discussion states that 
port congestion mainly became a problem from 2006, which is reflected in our data series on port 
congestion. You could therefore believe that port congestion would have a smaller effect on the 
hedging efficiency in the first period. However, it seems that this is offset by the increased 
congestion during the peak years before the market plummet.  
 
Compared to the results on hedging efficiency found for different speed levels, it seems that port 
congestion has a smaller effect on hedging efficiency than operating with the charterparty speed. 
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If shipowners choose to operate at the Baltic standard speed or the theoretical optimal, duration 
seems to only reduce hedging efficiency by a couple of percentage. If shipowners choose to 
operate at the charterparty speed, observed industry average, the efficiency is expected to be 
reduced four times as much. 
 
5.4 Technical differences 
In this section we will examine how different technical specifications affect earnings. The 
following results are based on the three different vessels introduced in section 4.2.326 operating at 
optimal speed in an environment without port congestion and sea margin. 
 
Exhibit 5.8: Technical specifications influence on actual earnings  
 
Difference between daily earnings and BCI for the three vessels in the period 2009-2012 
 
Exhibit 5.8 shows daily difference between actual earnings and BCI for the Baltic standard 
vessel, Hanjin Haypoint and Cape Azalea. An expected result would be that the daily difference 
increases the more vessel specifications differ from the Baltic standard vessel. Though, this does 
not seem to be the case, as the vessel Hanjin Haypoint has a lower daily difference than the Baltic 
standard vessel. The differences are rather a result of different earnings compared to BCI. Due to 
                                                 
26 These are; Baltic Standard vessel with loading capacity of 172,000 dwt, Cape Azalea with loading capacity of 
220,000dwt and Hanjin Haypoint with loading capacity of 150,302dwt. Each of the vessels has unequal fuel 
consumption and design speed. For more information see table 4.2.3 
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the basis risk timing and geography does the Baltic Standard vessel, on average, have a higher 
income relative to BCI. Hanjin Haypoint has on average a more similar income rate relative to 
BCI, due to is loading capacity. Cape Azalea, which has a higher loading capacity than the Baltic 
standard vessel, will have a significant higher income relative to BCI. The fact that vessels earn 
more than BCI relates to development in seaborne trade and the composition of BCI. Freight 
rates on Backhaul routes are low compared to the other major routes, which can be seen in 
appendix 9.3. Over the last decade the number of Backhaul voyages has been reduced 
significantly. According exhibit 2.1 the number of Backhauls has been reduced from 18.5% to 
only 4.7%. BCI are equally weighted of the four major routes, which means that 25% of its value 
is determined by Backhaul rates. Therefore, on average will daily income for a vessel be higher 
than BCI. A smaller vessel, like Hanjin Haypoint, has therefore an income, which is more similar 
to BCI. 
 
It is expected that the difference in daily income would be reflected in terms of optimal hedge 
ratio and hedging efficiency. However, it is evident in exhibit 5.9 that there are only small 
differences between the three vessels. 
 
Exhibit 5.9: Technical specifications influence on hedging performance 
 
Presentation of optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency based on the three different vessels in the period 2009-
2012 
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We have earlier stressed the fact that both the optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency is 
highly determined by correlation. Seen in exhibit 5.9, the difference in correlation between the 
vessels is relatively small, even though there are large technical differences. The most influential 
specification for actual earnings is loading capacity. Since vessels load constant at 95%, the 
capacity has little effect on the monthly simple return. The regression is based on simple returns, 
which do not change if all monthly averages are changed by the same amount. Also if vessels 
operate at the charterparty or optimal speed, the design speed will not affect the results. Technical 
specifications seem therefore to have a relatively small impact on the optimal hedge ratio and 
hedging efficiency, despite large differences between the three vessels. 
 
Recall that the beta used when calculating the optimal speed is assumed to be constant and equal 
in all three calculations. Since beta determines the slope of the exponential function, seen in 
equation 2827, the ratio between vessels will not be much affected by fuel consumption. In reality 
there might be larger differences, as the exponential function for fuel consumption varies in terms 
of beta. 
 
5.5 A Realistic scenario 
This section will examine a realistic scenario of how good BCI is as a proxy for actual earnings. 
The results presented are based on the three different vessels, including all basis risks described 
in previous sections. The vessels will operate at theoretical optimal speed. To emphasize the 
effect basis risk has, the results will be compared to the result in 5.2, where timing and geography 
are the only basis risks. 
                                                 
27 Representation of equation 28: F = α ∗ 𝑉ఉ in the range Vmin < V < Vmax 
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Exhibit 5.10: Realistic hedging performance 
 
The exhibit highlights the effect that basis risk has on hedging effectiveness. The exhibit indicate that hedging 
performance  when only the basis risk from geography and timing are present, yields a higher hedging efficiency 
than the realistic scenario. Note that Geography and Timing in 2009-2012 is based on optimal speed due to 
instability with Baltic standard speed 
 
As seen from the previous results, the hedging effectiveness has gone down as it is implemented 
more basis risk into the simulation. The hedging efficiency dropped less than what is expected 
after examining each basis risk factor. This may be explained by the fact that some basis risk 
factors are offset by others.  
 
If BCI is a perfect proxy for actual earnings, the hedging efficiency should be 100%. Results 
show that hedging efficiency with an optimal hedge ratio converges to 15 - 35% for larger fleet 
sizes. This indicates that BCI is not a good proxy for actual Capesize earnings.  
 
5.6 One year hedging perspective 
So far we have only looked at long hedging horizons, 4 and 5 years. To illustrate how market 
conditions affect the relationship between BCI and actual earnings, the following section will 
highlight earnings on a year-to-year basis. These simulations are based on a realistic view, where 
Baltic standard vessels operate at optimal speed in an environment with port congestion and a 5% 
sea margin. 
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In   section   5.1.1   we   discussed   the   “lag”   effect   and   how   this   was   affected   by   different   market 
conditions. The Capesize market has been stable some years, and extremely volatile in others. It 
is by no surprise that the daily difference between annual periods differ significantly, seen in 
table 5.4. In 2008, when the market plummets, the “lag” in actual earnings yields the largest daily 
difference between earnings and BCI. The smallest difference is observed in the years prior to the 
financial crisis. 
 
Table 5.4: Annual hedging performance 
# Vessels 1 2 3 5 10 15 25 50 
RMS         
Max, 2008 2.070 1.894 1.826 1.751 1.717 1.676 1.654 1.641 
Min, 2006 0.310 0.241 0.215 0.189 0.167 0.160 0.153 0.148 
Hedge ratio         
Max, 2005 0.631 0.588 0.598 0.594 0.585 0.583 0.579 0.574 
Min, 2012 0.112 0.110 0.104 0.105 0.103 0.101 0.098 0.099 
Hedge Efficiency         
Max, 2005 0.149 0.233 0.282 0.335 0.394 0.419 0.438 0.450 
Min, 2010 0.013 0.024 0.026 0.036 0.043 0.046 0.043 0.046 
Presentation of maximum and minimum observations on RMS, optimal hedge ratio and hedging efficiency based on 
year-to-year simulations 
 
Hedging efficiency differ significantly on a year-to-year basis. BCI is best as a proxy on years 
where there are small fluctuations in freight rates. The maximum obtained hedging efficiency is 
seen in 2005, with 45% for larger fleets. This is in contrast to 2010, where the hedging efficiency 
is not more than 4.6% for larger fleets. This implies that BCI as a proxy on short horizons is not 
preferable compared to longer horizons, as the outcome is highly unpredictable.  
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5.7 Case: Atlantic or the Pacific basin? 
An interesting study is to see if operating solely in one basin increases similarity between BCI 
and actual earnings. These simulations are based on a realistic view, where Baltic standard 
vessels operate at optimal speed in an environment with port congestion and a 5% sea margin. 
To emphasize possible differences, four hypothetical shipowners are included in the simulation. 
One of them moves his fleet around the world, obtaining freight rates from both the Pacific and 
the Atlantic basin. Two of them operate solely in one basin, thus one operates in the Atlantic and 
the other in the Pacific basin. The last shipowner moves between the basins constantly, meaning 
that he is only fixed on Backhaul and Fronthaul voyages. Exhibit 5.11 shows the hedging 
efficiency for the two periods. 
 
Exhibit 5.11: Hedging efficiency for voyages operating in different regions.  
The exhibit shows hedging efficiency for the four shipowners for the periods 2004-2008 and 2009-2012 
 
The results indicate a clear difference in hedging efficiency for the four shipowners. The two 
shipowners who operate in one basin obtain a higher hedging efficiency compared to the others. 
The shipowner who is only fixed on Front- or Backhauls has significantly lower hedge efficiency. 
This is likely due to different voyage durations between Fronthaul/Backhaul and Atlantic/Pacific 
round voyages. A Fronthaul or Backhaul voyage usually takes 60 - 70 days excluding port 
congestion, if the vessel operates at Baltic standard speed. While the duration on a Trans- 
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Pacific/Atlantic voyage is about 30- 40 days excluding port congestion, operating at Baltic 
standard speed. In other words, the duration on Fronthaul and Backhaul is almost the double. 
This implies that changed market conditions, BCI, will much sooner be reflected if the vessels 
avoid  longer  voyages.  A  reduced  “lag”  effect  implies  a  higher  correlation between BCI and daily 
income, which ultimately imply a higher hedging efficiency. Therefore it seems optimal for a 
shipowner to reduce longer voyages, such as Fronthaul and Backhaul, to a minimum in order to 
increase hedging efficiency. Hence, operating solely in one basin increases the similarity between 
BCI and actual earnings.  
There is also a clear difference between operating in the Atlantic and Pacific basin. In general, 
there should not be large differences between the basins, as each is equally weighted in BCI. A 
possible explanation can be port congestion. Historically port congestion has been a larger 
problem in the Pacific basin, especially on major routes between Australia and China.  
 
 
The exhibit shows hedging efficiency for two shipowners that operate in the Atlantic and Pacific basin, without port 
congestion 
 
Exhibit 5.12 shows hedging efficiency in an environment without port congestion for the two 
periods, 2004 – 2008 and 2009-2012. It shows that the difference is more than halved, though not 
fully removed. The differences are not large enough to conclude that operating solely in the 
Atlantic basin will yield higher similarity between BCI and actual earnings, than operating solely 
in the Pacific basin.  
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5.8 The dollar-offset method 
This section will present results from the dollar-offset method. To emphasize how the basis risks 
affect the earnings, we will compare result from a realistic scenario with a scenario with only 
geography and timing present. The realistic scenario is based on a Baltic standard vessel 
operating at optimal speed in an environment with port congestion and a sea margin of 5%. 
 
As discussed in section 3.6 we find it appropriate to compare results based on linear regression, 
with a more practical approach. The dollar-offset method does not rely heavily on correlation, 
and it is therefore expected that results from the two methods deviate. Through the analysis based 
on regression there has been evident that correlation between actual earnings and BCI are low, 
which may yield artificial low hedge ratios and hedging efficiency. Exhibit 5.13 shows a 
graphical plot of the implied efficiency for different hedge ratios. 
 
Exhibit 5.13: Hedging performance with the dollar-offset method 
 
The exhibit shows hedging efficiency for a scenario with only geography and timing present and a realistic scenario, 
for different hedge ratios for the period 2009-2012 
 
If BCI is a perfect proxy for actual earnings, the absolute change in BCI and actual earnings 
should be similar. The cumulative changes in earnings would then be completely offset by the 
cumulative changes in BCI, and the graph would have an absolute difference of 0% at a hedge 
ratio  of  1.0.  Any  deviation  from  this  point  is  a  result  of  basis  risks,  the  “lag”  effect  and   the fact 
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that actual earnings are based on a fleet average. The latter imply that changes in actual earnings 
will be smaller compared to BCI, and the dollar-offset ratio will then be larger than 1.0. To obtain 
a dollar-offset ratio of 1.0, the optimal hedge ratio must therefore be lower than 1.0. From exhibit 
5.13,  it  is  clear  that  the  “lag”  effect,  the  fact  that  actual earnings is based on an average and the 
basis risks geography and timing has the largest impact on actual earnings. At this point, the 
optimal hedge ratio is reduced to just above 0.80. The red line illustrates a scenario when also 
port congestion and operating speed are present. Port congestion and operating speed does not 
seem to have major impact on actual earnings, as the optimal hedge ratio only changes slightly. 
This is consistent with results found using single linear regression.    
 
Since the correlation between BCI and actual earnings is low, the linear regression implies that 
BCI is not a good proxy for actual earnings. This is in contrast to the dollar-offset method were 
results based on a realistic scenario suggests that a hedge ratio of about 0.8 in 2009-2012 is only 
5% away from 100% hedging efficiency. This implies that BCI is a good proxy for actual 
earnings. 
 
Recall from section 4.2.8 that all results are based on 500 fleets, and that income among these 
will vary. Hence, there will be fleets that fall out of the standard range, even when the average 
hedging efficiency is maximized. Exhibit 5.14 shows the percentage of fleets that fall out of the 
standardized 0.80 - 1.25 efficiency range. As the fleet sizes increases, the number of inefficient 
fleet will eventually be zero.  In 2004-2008, the revenue was more stable than 2009-2012, and 
fleets containing of 5 or more vessels were all inside the efficient range. In 2009-2012, it was 
necessary with a fleet size of 43 vessels to obtain a similar result. 
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Exhibit 5.14: Percentage inefficient fleet based on optimal hedge ratio 
  
The exhibit shows percentage inefficient fleets in 2004-2008 and 2009-2012. In 2004-2008, the optimal hedge ratio 
was about 0.9, while in 2009-2012, the optimal hedge ratio was about 0.8 
 
5.8.1 Technical specifications influence on the dollar-offset method 
The influence of technical specifications on actual earnings is important, as in reality most 
vessels deviate significantly from the Baltic standard vessel. Results from the linear regression 
suggested that different technical specifications had only a small effect on the optimal hedge ratio 
and hedging efficiency, as the correlation was only slightly affected. The daily differences 
between actual earnings and BCI differed clearly between the three vessels, evident in exhibit 
5.8. Therefore, as the dollar-offset method is based on cumulative differences, results should be 
more affected by different technical specifications. 
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Exhibit 5.15: Technical specifications impact on hedging performance 
 
The exhibit shows the absolute difference from 100% efficiency for the Baltic standard vessel, Hanjin Haypoint and 
Cape Azalea for the period 2009-2012 
 
Exhibit 5.15 shows the absolute difference from 100% hedging efficiency for the three vessels. It 
is evident that the hedge ratio that maximizes the efficiency clearly deviates between the three 
vessels. Cape Azalea, which has a higher loading capacity than the standard vessel, maximizes 
efficiency on a hedge ratio of 1.15. While the smaller vessel in terms of loading capacity, Hanjin 
Haypoint, optimizes hedging efficiency by a hedge ratio of 0.7. The difference seen in hedge 
ratio between the three vessels is rather intuitive. BCI is based on the Baltic standard vessel, with 
dwt of 172,000 tonnes. If a shipowner has a larger vessel than the standard vessel, the cumulative 
changes in earnings will be larger. The shipowner will therefore need more contracts per vessel, 
than if he had a vessel with similar dwt. The same discussion applies for the smaller vessel, 
Hanjin Haypoint. Here the cumulative differences are smaller in actual earnings compared to 
BCI, and to offset these changes you need fewer contracts.  
 
Exhibit 5.16 shows the percentage inefficient fleet for the different types of vessels based on 
optimal hedge ratios. 
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Exhibit 5.16: Percentage inefficient fleet based on optimal hedge ratio 
 
The exhibit shows percentage inefficient fleets in 2009-2012 for the Baltic standard vessel, Hanjin Haypoint and 
Cape Azalea. The optimal hedge ratio was about 0.8, 0.7 and 1.15 respectively 
 
5.9 Concluding remarks 
We first introduced some general observations about actual earnings, unaffected by different 
basis risks. The difference between actual earnings and BCI can in large part be explained by the 
“lag”   in   actual earnings, due to duration of voyages. It has also been evident that the daily 
difference between actual earnings and BCI stabilizes at fleet sizes of 10 vessels. Hence, 
increasing the fleet size will not reduce the difference significantly. The stabilization is mainly 
due to the fact that daily income to a shipowner is calculated based on moving averages. In 
addition, the results show that the correlation between actual earnings and BCI is low. This 
implies low optimal hedge ratio and hedge efficiency, as these measures are highly determined by 
correlation. 
 
In   addition   to   the   “lag”   effect,   the   results   suggests   that   the   low   hedging   efficiency   can   be  
explained by the basis risk geography and timing. The effect from these factors is not separated, 
making it hard to conclude which factor has the largest impact. The other basis risks, such as 
technical specifications, operating speed and port congestion, have relatively low impact on 
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actual earnings. The results suggest that when incorporating more basis risk factors in the 
simulations, they offset each other out. Though, it seems that operating speed has a larger 
influence than the two others. Overall, the linear regression analysis indicates that BCI on a 
longer horizon is not a good proxy for actual Capesize earnings, as the hedging efficiency is low. 
BCI did not prove to be a better proxy on a year-to-year basis as the results were highly 
unpredictable and vulnerable for volatile market conditions.  
 
We also analyzed if BCI was a better proxy if a shipowner were only operating in one basin. The 
hedging efficiency increased, due to shorter voyages. Longer voyages, such as Front- and 
Backhauls, increase the difference between BCI and daily income and reduce the overall hedging 
efficiency. Overall, the increase was not large enough to conclude that BCI is a good proxy. 
 
Results from the dollar-offset method also suggested that the basis risk operating speed and port 
congestion had only a little effect on the hedging efficiency. Compared to the linear regression, 
the dollar-offset method implies that vessel specifications have a larger effect on optimal hedge 
ratio and hedging efficiency. The method suggests that the optimal hedge ratio for the two 
periods 2004-2008 and 2009-2012 are 0.9 and 0.8 respectively. With these hedge ratios, 
cumulative changes in actual earnings are almost completely offset by cumulative changes in 
BCI. This indicates that BCI is a good proxy for actual Capesize earnings.  
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6. Limitations and further research 
Throughout this dissertation the reader has been provided with limitations regarding different 
aspects and calculations. In the following section we will summarize and elaborate on limitations 
regarding the model and our findings. The chapter will be divided into two sections. First, there 
will be a presentation of limitations related to the simulation model. Next, other limitations and 
further research will be discussed. 
 
6.1 Limitations regarding simulations 
There has been necessary to make several adjustments and assumptions when simulating physical 
cash flows, since simulating a complete realistic cash flow is almost impossible. Some 
assumptions will typically have a larger impact on the outcome than others and are presented 
below.  
 
An important limitation is the implementation of just ten out of numerous different routes, and 
that these routes are randomly chosen based on historical trade flows in the period 2003 – 2012 
for the four major routes. It is thought that ten routes are sufficient to simulate realistic cash 
flows, however it would be even more realistic if more routes were implemented. As we lack data 
on trade flows for each specific route, each route within a category has been given an equal 
weighting. Routes were randomly chosen on the basis of this probability.  
 
There is not taken account for any strategic repositioning of vessels. This means that it is 
assumed a know-nothing behavior from the shipowner, as he does not believe that he can beat the 
market by optimizing chartering strategies. A more realistic assumption might be to assume that 
shipowner has developed a fairly detailed knowledge of the industry. Hence, his ability to predict 
voyage rates is above average. A solution might be to implement ideas from the Black-Litterman 
approach (Black & Litterman, 1992). The Black-Litterman model enables investors to combine 
their unique views regarding the performance of various assets with the implied returns in a 
manner that results in intuitive, diversified portfolios.  
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The model is based on an incomplete data set on port congestion. For some ports we lack 
historical data on certain periods, while on other ports we lack data for the entire period. A 
complete data set on port congestion is essential to obtain a realistic simulation. To overcome this 
problem we had to make estimates based on previous and later registrations. Thus, some of the 
ports might in reality have had a complete different congestion than implemented in the model. In 
addition, port congestion is typically larger on major routes. Since the model is only based on 
major routes in the Capesize segment, it is possible that port congestion has systematically been 
overestimated. Both these elements imply that the observed basis risk due to port congestion is at 
best inaccurate. 
 
Another limitation is related to the optimal speed approach. The model does not include 
development in spot prices during a voyage when calculating optimal speed. The speed is only 
dependent on the freight rate when the vessel begins the laden or ballast voyage. As discussed 
before, the freight market is very volatile and the shipowner can therefore step into a contract at a 
point where the rates are well below levels that might be obtained on the next voyage. 
Expectancy of high freight rates on the next voyage should yield a higher optimal speed for the 
first  voyage.  Such  “look  ahead  bias”  could be implemented by using FFA contracts as a proxy for 
market expectations. 
 
6.2 Other limitations and further research 
The dissertation is based on the definition that forward prices converge to spot price at maturity. 
Since forward freight agreements in the Capesize segment are bought and hold trough maturity, 
what matters is the difference between spot index and actual earnings. However, if contracts are 
not held through maturity, this analysis is less relevant. We therefore find it appropriate to 
conduct a similar analysis on forward freight agreements. 
 
There are limitations regarding the linear regression framework used for calculating optimal 
hedge ratio and hedging efficiency. In section 3.5.2 we introduced 5 assumptions that the method 
is based on. Because of our practical approach and the extensive test necessary, we have assumed 
that four of those assumptions hold. If one or more of these assumptions are violated the model 
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could encounter a combination of three problems; the coefficient estimates are wrong, the 
associated standard errors are wrong or the distributions that were assumed for the tests statistics 
are inappropriate (Brooks, 2008). Hence, it is possible that wrong conclusions are drawn from the 
regression analysis. A continuance would be to test these assumptions. 
 
The regression analysis, derived from Ederington’s  framework, is based on the restriction that the 
hedge ratio is constant over time. Studies done by Baillie & Myers (1991) and Moschini & Myers 
(2002) recognized that spot-futures distribution is time- varying, and that hedge ratio therefore 
should be time-dependent. One way for addressing this problem is by using the multivariate 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model to estimate the 
conditional second moments that are relevant for hedge ratio estimation (Myers, 1991). Since the 
hedge ratio changes as new information arrives to the markets, generally, this realistic ratio tends 
to outperform the static ordinary least squares in terms of risk reduction size (Sheu, Lee, & Lai, 
2013). 
 
A possible further study would be to examine whether the results are transferable to other sector 
and segments within shipping. For instance, there are several studies examining hedging 
efficiency in the Panamax segment. Though, as far as we know, no similar research has been 
conducted on the Panamax segment.  
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7. Summary and conclusion 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine if the Baltic Capesize Index is a good proxy for 
actual Capesize earnings, and highlight factors that influence earnings. In practice, forward 
freight agreements are bought and held through maturity, and forward prices will per definition 
converge to spot prices as they reach maturity. Therefore, the difference between spot index and 
actual earnings may implicate if forward freight agreements are suitable for revenue management 
in practice. To approach this problem we have simulated physical cash flows for different fleet 
sizes in the period 2004 to 2012. These physical cash flows are compared to the Baltic Capesize 
Index when different basis risk factors are present. 
 
A key parameter with this approach is to simulate as realistic cash flows as possible. We have 
therefore devoted a major part of this dissertation to create a realistic model based on historical 
data. To evaluate if the Baltic Capesize Index is a good proxy, we have examined differences 
between actual earnings and the Baltic Capesize Index and implemented frameworks for hedging 
performance. The linear regression model, which is based on Ederington`s framework (1979), 
shows how it is possible to find a hedge ratio that minimizes a portfolio’s variance, and its 
hedging efficiency. This framework is highly dependent of correlation, and may not be a suitable 
method in shipping. The freight market is a hard-to-define market, and an excessive degree of 
statistical accuracy in calculation of correlations may be misleading. We have therefore 
introduced the dollar-offset method as an alternative to the more accepted linear regression 
method. The dollar-offset method is not highly dependent on correlation, but rather absolute 
changes.  
 
We have performed several simulations under variation of different basis risk factors, in order to 
determine what separates the Baltic Capesize Index from being a perfect proxy for actual 
earnings. Both methods applied suggest that large fleet sizes have little effect on hedging 
performance. It is in practice no difference in hedging performance for a fleet consisting of 10 
vessels compared to a fleet of 100 vessels. The basis risk factors timing and geography together 
with  the  “lag”  effect  between  actual earnings and Baltic Capesize Index has greatest influence on 
actual  earnings.  The  “lag”  effect  is  increased  with  long  hauls,  and  higher  efficiencies  are  obtained  
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if vessels operate solely in one basin. Basis risk coming from operating speed and port congestion 
have a relatively little impact on actual earnings. These factors yield a low correlation between 
Baltic Capesize Index and actual earnings, which result in a low hedging efficiency for the 
regression analysis. The two methods applied yields different results when analyzing technical 
specifications. In linear regression they have little impact, as they do not seem to affect the 
correlation. Though, they have a large effect on cash flows, which makes them more important 
according to the dollar-offset method.  
 
Findings based on the regression analysis imply that Baltic Capesize Index is not a good proxy 
for actual earnings, as hedging efficiency is relatively low. This may indicate that forward freight 
agreements are not a suitable hedging instrument for revenue management in practice. This 
conclusion is in stark contrast to results obtained by the dollar-offset method.  The dollar-offset 
method indicates that with an optimal hedge ratio, cumulative changes in actual earnings are 
almost completely offset by cumulative changes in the Baltic Capesize Index. This indicates that 
the Baltic Capesize Index is actually a good proxy for actual Capesize earnings, and that forward 
freight agreements are suitable for revenue management in practice.  
 
Results from the two methods applied are in contrast to each other. Linear regression is a more 
common and accepted method within finance, but evidence suggests that it is not well suited 
within the shipping industry. The dollar-offset method seems to be more appropriate, but the 
method is less common and has clear weaknesses. No research has been conducted on which 
methods are preferable within shipping, and it is therefore difficult to conclude if the Baltic 
Capesize Index is a good proxy for actual Capesize earnings. 
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9. Appendices 
9.1 Trend in congestion 
 
Exhibit 9.1: Observed trend in port congestion 
 
 
The exhibit shows observed trend in port congestion for port Dampier located in Australia 
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9.2 Results 
In the following section all our results are presented. Each of the tables headlines which basis risk 
factor that is implemented in the simulation. There is also specified vessel type, operating speed 
and if sea margin or port congestion are present. All results are based on simulation where fleets 
contain up to 50 vessels.  
 
BASIS RISK: OPERATING SPEED       
Vessel Baltic std         
Operating speed Changing         
Sea margin 0%         
Port Congestion No         
  # of vessels 1 2 3 5 10 25 50 
RMS 
2004-2008 Baltic Std 0.913 0.815 0.777 0.752 0.709 0.686 0.676 Optimal  0.986 0.882 0.834 0.812 0.769 0.747 0.743 Charterparty 1.145 1.022 0.977 0.958 0.933 0.903 0.903 2009-2012 Baltic Std 0.935 0.743 0.662 0.584 0.516 0.475 0.461 Optimal  1.168 1.086 1.056 1.031 1.010 1.002 0.998 Charterparty 1.126 1.004 0.964 0.931 0.902 0.886 0.881 
Hedge ratio 
2004-2008 Baltic Std 0.580 0.563 0.552 0.553 0.548 0.545 0.542 Optimal  0.595 0.567 0.555 0.544 0.539 0.540 0.541 Charterparty 0.441 0.428 0.422 0.430 0.430 0.424 0.423 2009-2012 Baltic Std 0.360 0.521 0.229 0.654 0.295 0.532 0.509 Optimal  0.322 0.301 0.289 0.289 0.283 0.281 0.281 Charterparty 1.420 0.276 0.258 0.249 0.247 0.242 0.243 
Hedging Efficiency 
2004-2008 Baltic Std 0.112 0.189 0.228 0.283 0.334 0.377 0.389 Optimal  0.124 0.193 0.233 0.278 0.327 0.370 0.390 Charterparty 0.093 0.150 0.181 0.228 0.265 0.293 0.304 2009-2012 Baltic Std 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.121 0.364 Optimal  0.055 0.114 0.145 0.181 0.212 0.237 0.245 Charterparty 0.000 0.007 0.035 0.160 0.200 0.225 0.237 
The table shows the effect changes in operating speed has on RMS, Optimal Hedge Ratio and Hedging efficiency for 
a standard Baltic Capesize vessel for the two periods 2004-2008 and 2009-2012 
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BASIS RISK: PORT CONGESTION        
Vessel Baltic std        
Operating speed Optimal speed       
Sea margin 0%        
Port Congestion Yes        
 # of vessels 1 2 3 5 10 25 50 
RMS 
2004-2008 1.006 0.869 0.824 0.796 0.774 0.759 0.747 2009-2012 1.103 1.005 0.978 0.942 0.921 0.907 0.899 
Hedge ratio 
2004-2008 0.584 0.563 0.543 0.537 0.532 0.527 0.529 2009-2012 1.103 1.005 0.978 0.942 0.921 0.907 0.899 
Hedging Efficiency 
2004-2008 0.096 0.161 0.195 0.244 0.299 0.345 0.368 2009-2012 0.041 0.089 0.116 0.146 0.180 0.205 0.214 
The table presents the effect port congestion has on RMS, Optimal Hedge Ratio and Hedging Efficiency for a 
standard Baltic Capesize vessel operating at optimal speed in the two periods 2004-2008 and 2009-2012 
 
BASIS RISK: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS        
Vessel Baltic std         
Operating speed Optimal speed        
Sea margin 0%         
Port Congestion No         
  # of vessels 1 2 3 5 10 25 50 
RMS 
2004-2008 Baltic Std 0.986 0.882 0.834 0.812 0.769 0.747 0.743 Cape Azalea 0.900 0.805 0.768 0.739 0.712 0.685 0.677 Hanjin Haypoint 0.873 0.793 0.772 0.744 0.713 0.694 0.683 2009-2012 Baltic Std 1.168 1.086 1.056 1.031 1.010 1.002 0.998 Cape Azalea 1.787 1.689 1.652 1.628 1.607 1.593 1.588 Hanjin Haypoint 0.966 0.892 0.863 0.840 0.825 0.817 0.811 
Hedge ratio 
2004-2008 Baltic Std 0.595 0.567 0.555 0.544 0.539 0.540 0.541 Cape Azalea 0.560 0.533 0.525 0.518 0.511 0.508 0.509 Hanjin Haypoint 0.553 0.530 0.520 0.513 0.510 0.509 0.508 2009-2012 Baltic Std 0.322 0.301 0.289 0.289 0.283 0.281 0.281 Cape Azalea 0.334 0.311 0.298 0.292 0.285 0.283 0.282 Hanjin Haypoint 0.292 0.277 0.269 0.262 0.259 0.257 0.257 
Hedging Efficiency 
2004-2008 Baltic Std 0.124 0.193 0.233 0.278 0.327 0.370 0.390 Cape Azalea 0.118 0.189 0.226 0.272 0.317 0.351 0.366 Hanjin Haypoint 0.113 0.185 0.221 0.268 0.315 0.353 0.367 2009-2012 Baltic Std 0.055 0.114 0.145 0.181 0.212 0.237 0.245 Cape Azalea 0.074 0.138 0.167 0.199 0.227 0.251 0.261 Hanjin Haypoint 0.054 0.111 0.140 0.169 0.196 0.219 0.228 
The table presents the effect that technical differences has on RMS, Optimal Hedge Ratio and Hedging Efficiency for 
a standard Baltic Capesize vessel operating at optimal speed in the two periods 2004-2008 and 2009-2012 
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BASIS RISK: REALISTIC APPROACH        
Vessel Different         
Operating speed Optimal speed        
Sea margin 5%         
Port Congestion Yes         
  # of vessels 1 2 3 5 10 25 50 
RMS 
2004-2008 Baltic Std 0.990 0.878 0.829 0.807 0.771 0.743 0.740 Cape Azalea 1.314 1.188 1.154 1.098 1.065 1.055 1.049 Hanjin Haypoint 0.935 0.841 0.804 0.767 0.730 0.713 0.699 2009-2012 Baltic Std 1.023 0.929 0.892 0.863 0.834 0.818 0.813 Cape Azalea 1.519 1.415 1.373 1.338 1.311 1.291 1.287 Hanjin Haypoint 0.861 0.778 0.748 0.722 0.699 0.688 0.684 
Hedge ratio 
2004-2008 Baltic Std 0.563 0.539 0.531 0.524 0.519 0.516 0.513 Cape Azalea 0.585 0.558 0.546 0.530 0.516 0.515 0.512 Hanjin Haypoint 0.531 0.503 0.497 0.496 0.489 0.487 0.486 2009-2012 Baltic Std 0.302 0.276 0.269 0.265 0.260 0.262 0.260 Cape Azalea 0.277 0.274 0.273 0.269 0.263 0.260 0.259 Hanjin Haypoint 0.299 0.258 0.254 0.249 0.247 0.245 0.244 
Hedging Efficiency 
2004-2008 Baltic Std 0.091 0.151 0.190 0.236 0.288 0.331 0.348 Cape Azalea 0.103 0.166 0.206 0.248 0.297 0.346 0.363 Hanjin Haypoint 0.089 0.146 0.179 0.224 0.273 0.317 0.333 2009-2012 Baltic Std 0.040 0.082 0.109 0.137 0.166 0.194 0.202 Cape Azalea 0.040 0.093 0.124 0.155 0.184 0.208 0.217 Hanjin Haypoint 0.046 0.087 0.111 0.137 0.169 0.190 0.198 
The table presents results for a realistic simulation where different vessels operate at optimal speed, with port 
congestion and obtain a 5% sea margin for the two periods 2004-2008 and 2009-2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114 
ANNUAL         
Vessel Baltic Standard       
Operating speed Optimal speed       
Sea margin 5%        
Port Congestion Yes        
 # of vessels 1 2 3 5 10 25 50 
RMS 
2004 0.285 0.228 0.206 0.185 0.169 0.157 0.153 2005 0.379 0.309 0.280 0.257 0.235 0.222 0.218 2006 0.310 0.241 0.215 0.189 0.167 0.153 0.148 2007 0.289 0.246 0.229 0.215 0.204 0.196 0.194 2008 2.070 1.894 1.826 1.751 1.717 1.654 1.641 2009 0.517 0.433 0.400 0.372 0.348 0.334 0.328 2010 0.518 0.431 0.401 0.366 0.343 0.329 0.323 2011 0.780 0.697 0.659 0.635 0.617 0.607 0.602 2012 1.888 1.752 1.719 1.680 1.648 1.624 1.622 
Hedge ratio 
2004 0.401 0.395 0.388 0.383 0.396 0.395 0.393 2005 0.631 0.588 0.598 0.594 0.585 0.579 0.574 2006 0.324 0.346 0.354 0.365 0.363 0.357 0.347 2007 0.509 0.466 0.454 0.440 0.425 0.402 0.396 2008 0.295 0.254 0.241 0.229 0.224 0.218 0.215 2009 0.507 0.436 0.430 0.424 0.413 0.405 0.405 2010 0.172 0.163 0.144 0.143 0.137 0.128 0.128 2011 0.200 0.213 0.223 0.213 0.210 0.210 0.211 2012 0.112 0.110 0.104 0.105 0.103 0.098 0.099 
Hedging Efficiency 
2004 0.062 0.107 0.130 0.156 0.201 0.227 0.236 2005 0.149 0.233 0.282 0.335 0.394 0.438 0.450 2006 0.018 0.037 0.053 0.081 0.107 0.133 0.140 2007 0.038 0.065 0.090 0.131 0.184 0.236 0.267 2008 0.093 0.097 0.099 0.098 0.104 0.104 0.103 2009 0.074 0.143 0.186 0.241 0.281 0.307 0.318 2010 0.013 0.024 0.026 0.036 0.043 0.043 0.046 2011 0.032 0.068 0.101 0.127 0.169 0.215 0.237 2012 0.010 0.033 0.049 0.071 0.094 0.107 0.117 
The table presents RMS, Optimal Hedge Ratio and Hedging Efficiency for a Baltic standard Capesize vessel 
operating at optimal speed, obtaining port congestion and a 5% sea margin. The results show that BCI is best as a 
proxy on years where there are small fluctuations in freight rates 
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BASIS RISK: Geography        
Vessel Baltic Std         
Operating speed Optimal speed        
Sea margin 5%         
Port Congestion Yes         
  # of vessels 1 2 3 5 10 25 50 
RMS 
Atlantic 2004-2008 0.628 0.576 0.557 0.538 0.528 0.521 0.518 2009-2012 0.807 0.765 0.750 0.739 0.728 0.724 0.723 Pacific 2004-2008 0.514 0.455 0.436 0.422 0.408 0.402 0.399 2009-2012 0.694 0.662 0.652 0.644 0.638 0.632 0.631 FHC-BHC 2004-2008 1.633 1.467 1.413 1.364 1.322 1.288 1.282 2009-2012 1.397 1.274 1.227 1.191 1.167 1.152 1.146 
Hedge ratio 
Atlantic 2004-2008 0.666 0.659 0.659 0.657 0.655 0.654 0.653 2009-2012 0.485 0.476 0.474 0.470 0.466 0.466 0.465 Pacific 2004-2008 0.654 0.642 0.638 0.639 0.637 0.637 0.637 2009-2012 0.370 0.366 0.363 0.363 0.361 0.360 0.360 FHC-BHC 2004-2008 0.448 0.369 0.349 0.333 0.326 0.318 0.316 2009-2012 0.311 0.202 0.176 0.165 0.161 0.152 0.150 
Hedging efficiency 
Atlantic 2004-2008 0.284 0.341 0.370 0.389 0.409 0.422 0.425 2009-2012 0.210 0.253 0.270 0.286 0.295 0.303 0.306 Pacific 2004-2008 0.181 0.242 0.275 0.309 0.336 0.357 0.364 2009-2012 0.113 0.159 0.177 0.198 0.213 0.222 0.226 FHC-BHC 2004-2008 0.025 0.039 0.051 0.072 0.108 0.145 0.163 2009-2012 0.019 0.028 0.036 0.049 0.069 0.080 0.087 
The table presents a Baltic standard Capesize vessel that operates at optimal speed solely in one basin with port 
congestion and a 5% sea margin 
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9.3 Historic development in freight rates 
 
Exhibit 9.2: Historical development in freight rates 
 
The exhibit shows time charter rates for the major routes. It is evident that Backhaul rates are consistently lower 
than the rates for other routes 
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